Letters: Rand as a Philosopher (April 1998)

[In his review of my book, Without a Prayer (Navigator, November 1997), Bryan Register] correctly acknowledges that my concern is to destroy "all the major claims of that philosophy [Objectivism]." His review, however, fails to mention most of Rand's major claims and nearly all of the arguments I direct against them. Rather, it consists largely of objections that, even if true, would not refute a single argument I offered. For example, Register finds "two major flaws" in my book: "Robbins's failure to attend to context when quoting authors and his failure to follow 'the principle of charity'. . ." Now, I hope the reader can enjoy the delicious irony of an Objectivist accusing a Christian of being uncharitable. Obviously, Register not only has an interest in ideas, he also has an excellent sense of humor. Rand, who wrote philosophy with a sledgehammer, would have appreciated the irony as well.

Register tells us that the "principle of charity" is "the principle that one should give the most reasonable interpretation to a view one attacks." That is certainly a good principle. But there is another principle of criticism, equally good, and in this case, eminently more applicable, the principle that I generally followed in Without a Prayer: Play it as it lies. That is, I took Rand's words as they actually were, not attempting to improve on them. That is clearly an accepted procedure in scholarly criticism. It is merely the assumption that an author means what he writes, and writes what he means. Furthermore, this principle applies in spades to Rand's writing, for she claimed that she could give a reason for every single word that appeared in Atlas Shrugged and that she was a logical hairsplitter in all her thinking and writing. Who am I to interpret her words in a "more reasonable" way? That disposes of a number of Register's objections to my book (and one of my major flaws).

Register gives an example of my alleged failure to attend to context by citing a quotation, not from Rand, but from David Kelley; but Register seems to misunderstand both Kelley and Robbins. Neither Kant nor Kelley accepts the Aristotelian "diaphanous model" of cognition, which was my point in quoting Kelley. Register argues that (according to Kelley) Kant did not reject the assumption implicit in the diaphanous model, that "diaphanousness . . . [is] a necessary condition for knowledge of things as they are in themselves," but that Kelley does reject this assumption. Certainly Kelley rejects that assumption in so many words, as I say in my book, but then Kelley turns around and tells us that we can never perceive things as they are in themselves, precisely because they interact with our senses. For example, we perceive color; but, says Kelley, the world is colorless. Kelley and Kant use the word "form" in different ways, but each asserts that we cannot know things as they are in themselves, but only things as they appear to us. To quote Kelley: "[Relativity] exists in regard to every perceptible attribute of things, in every modality of sense. That fact poses a central problem for the philosophy of perception." So my alleged quoting out of context does not misrepresent Kelley's views at all. . .

While I appreciate Mr. Register's attempt to review my book, his criticisms are that I am uncharitable, have tacky taste in bookcovers, quote out of context, make poor attempts at humor, offer a sophomoric and hysterical argument, and generally make myself look silly. Most of these things are not serious objections to the book. Even if true, which they are not, his criticisms would not overturn any significant argument I present. Mr. Register has simply missed the mark.

John Robbins
The Trinity Foundation
Unicoi, Tennessee

Bryan Register responds:

Robbins wishes to "play it as it lies" regarding Rand's writing, asking "Who am I to try to interpret her words in a 'more reasonable' way?" Similar questions might be, "Who am I to question the decisions of my superiors?" "Who am I to reconsider the moral tradition of my society?" and so forth. To an intrinsicist, truth in morality, philosophy, and textual interpretation are to be apprehended passively as in perception. Activity directed toward knowing on the part of the actor, thinker, or reader is thought to be presumptuous and distortive.

The poorly named "principle of charity" is just the principle of working to achieve objectivity in interpretation, and that is why Robbins rejects it: he believes that objectivity is a matter of allowing the Almighty (or at least the author) to impress the truth on one.

Robbins persists in claiming that David Kelley's theory of perception is a form of representationalism, saying that Kelley "tells us that we can never perceive things as they are in themselves, precisely because they interact with our senses." Robbins rests his misinterpretation on the assumption—explicitly and repeatedly rejected by Kelley—that seeing something as it is presented to our senses disallows us from seeing it as it is in itself. But Kelley's point is that one can see something as it is in itself only because one sees it as presented to one's senses. As usual, Robbins thinks that activity which is directed at knowing renders that knowing subjective.

Robbins notes that I fail to mention "nearly all of the arguments [he] directs against [Rand]." In a 3,000-word review, I could not hope to discuss all of the arguments made in a 250-page book. I selected out those arguments which seemed most representative. Had I been uncharitable, I might have picked Robbins's claim that existence and nonexistence are indistinguishable, or his Berkeleyan idealism, or his combination of Calvinist determinism with his moral condemnation of Ayn Rand for her "choice" of Objectivism.

University of Texas
Austin, Texas