| 2005 Summer Seminar |
—Jason Walker, M.A.
Course Description:
(Advanced Seminar session, advance registration is required. See the Advanced Seminar application form.)
Reductionism in philosophy of mind tends to draw scorn not only from many Analytic and Continental thinkers, but also from many Objectivists, who in particular are often drawn to "non-reductive" physicalist theories such as John Searle's biological naturalism. Jason Walker will argue that this is a mistake, that in fact, reductionism, properly construed, captures Objectivist premises and theories of consciousness remarkably well, and better than other competing lines of thought in philosophy of mind. A large component of this paper will argue against Searle's biological naturalism on the basis that it collapses into property dualism, and is thus vulnerable to the same objections.
Jason Walker is currently a doctoral student in philosophy at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. He earned his M.A. at Tufts University, and his B.A. from the University of Texas, Austin.
Schedule: Sunday, 2:15-3:30 PM
Track: Advanced Seminar