Fall 1999 Cyberseminar in Objectivist Studies:
"The Continental Origins of Postmodernism"

Week 2: September 20-26 to Week 3: September 27-October 3

DALE COMMENT ON REGISTER ON HEIDEGGER'S "WHAT IS METAPHYSICS?"

Sent: Thursday, September 23, 1999 9:59 AM

Subject: Cyberseminar: Commment: Getting a Grip on Nothing -WD

[From: William Dale ]

COMMENT ON "GETTING A GRIP ON NOTHING"

ABSTRACT
There are two Randian arguments Bryan discusses in his summary of
Heidegger's arguments in "What is Metaphysics?" which I discuss. One is
the "stolen concept" argument, and the other is the reification of the
zero. I also comment on the relationship of Heidegger's thesis on
nothingness to the emotion of dread.

STOLEN CONCEPTS

Rand's argument about stolen concepts is an important argument resting on
her view about epistemological hierarchy. The hierarchical view invoked
is that all of our knowledge rests on perception, and that the
verification of that knowledge rests on identifying the conceptual
connections between abstractions and perceptions. Given that
abstractions themselves are hierarchical, that some rest on previously
formed ones, the steps necessary to connect higher level abstractions to
perceptions are often extensive. One must know explicitly the criteria
David mentioned in this first post concerning units, their contrast
objects, CCDs, the dimension of isolation, and the some-but-any
principle. This makes it challenging to consistently maintain the
connections in the conceptual hierarchy.

If the above is true, then a (legitimate) concept that exists _between_ a
higher level concept and perceptions can't be implicitly invoked outside
its place in this hierarchy to refute the higher-level concept. For
instance, an obvious example is that one can't coherently argue against
egoism by asserting one will be rewarded in the afterlife by being
self-sacrificial. The concept of self-interest is the "stolen" concept
is defending self-sacrifice.

HEIDEGGER'S STEALING OF THE CONCEPT OF THE "STOLEN CONCEPT"

I don't think Heidegger is accurately employing the above "stolen
concept" argument in demanding a contrast object for existence. (Not
that Heidegger is trying to invoke an argument Rand named long after he
died. Rather, I don't think Bryan can invoke the argument on Heidegger's
behalf.) However, I do think he is cleverly confusing the issue by using
an argument that _looks like_ the stolen concept argument. One might say
this is stealing the stolen concept. Interestingly, I think this error
is a common one, even among objectivists, and it's an error that confuses
people trying to grasp the axiom of existence.

The axiomatic concept "existence" has an interesting conceptual status.
Since it is an axiom, its units are all things, or the world, and any
attempt to deny its validity is an automatic invocation of the stolen
concept. This is because an argument proposed against it simply _has_ to
implicitly deny the concept since _any_ validly-formed concept must rely
on its truth.

But what about a contrast object for the concept of existence? As
strange is it may seem, there is no (conventional) contrast object! It's
a mistake to insist on a search for one, because doing so is an example
of using a stolen concept. As Rand points out (IOE, 2nd Ed [hardback],
p. 58), this also results in there being no CCD for axiomatic concepts,
either. The contrast instead is between conventional facts, which
differentiate _some_ objects from others, and basic facts (or primaries),
which focus attention on _all_ entities. The need for naming the axiom
of existence in conceptual terms is to direct attention to it _as a
primary fact_, (along with identity and consciousness), i.e. a fact that
lies at the base of epistemology for fallible, volitional beings. As
with the other primaries, it provides a "regulatory role" in epistemology
by directing attention to its universality for all knowledge.

There is another pseudo-"contrast object" for the concept of existence:
the other axiomatic concepts. Each axiomatic concept has all of
existence as units, but each focuses attention on a different feature of
any existential situation of knowledge acquisition, thereby fulfilling
different epistemological needs. For example, the concept of identity
focuses attention on the fact that entities are what they are, i.e. that
they have specific identities, rather than on the fact that they exist.
The concept of consciousness focuses on the fact that awareness is
required for any knowledge acquisition. In this way, the axiomatic
concepts act as "contrast objects" for each other along the dimension of
epistemological need.

REIFYING NON-EXISTENCE

Heidegger makes the error of trying to reverse the crucial
epistemological asymmetry between the concept of existence and the
concept of non-existence. The second concept can only be formed in
reference to the first, to epistemologically designate a state-of-affairs
which does not obtain along the relevant dimension. For example, one can
indicate my current financial condition by stating, "There is nothing in
William's wallet." The concept of "nothingness" functions as an
epistemological placeholder to denote the lack of an entity, or the lack
of any quantity along the dimension of concern. It's not possible, in
contrast, to first form the concept "nothing," and then form the concept
existence. The concept of "nothing" is epistemologically parasitic on
the concept of existence. It's a mistake to ascribe ontological
standing and metaphysical importance to this epistemological
state-of-affairs. Rand names this mistake in the realm of the axioms the
Reification of the Zero.

(I believe one of the major achievementsin the history of mathematics was
the "discovery" of the concept "zero," suggestive evidence for the
epistemological claim of priority above.)

THE MOOD OF DREAD

I find Heidegger's invocation of (trying to) imagine non-existence
fascinating. He invites us to imagine our own non-existence, to thrust
ourselves into this state, and he suggest we will feel overwhelming dread
doing so. I must agree, and having watched some of my own cancer
patients try to come to grips with their own imminent demise, I would
suggest this is a universal reaction. Essentially, Heidegger is inviting
one to conceptualize a contradiction, a contradiction similar to
"imagining" a square triangle, but on the grand scale of the axioms! I
have to give him credit for urging the mind-body integration thesis on
us! I would think that the attempt to imagine this impossibility would
lead one to the rejection of the thesis, but I would be wrong in the case
of Heidegger.

Another thing I can say about this exercise proposed by H is that I think
Rand would agree with it in trying to understand an H's argument. She
suggests that one evaluate a philosophical thesis by, "...accept[ing]
it--for a few brief moments. Tell yourself, in effect: 'If I were to
accept it as true, what would follow?'...To take ideas seriously means
that you intend to live by, to practice, any idea you accept as true...In
order to evaluate it properly, ask yourself what a given theory, if
accepted, would do to a human life, staring with your own."
(Philosophical Detection, In: Philosophy: Who Needs It, P. 19
[Hardback]). I tend to agree.


William

Sent: Thursday, September 23, 1999 6:20 PM

Subject: Cyberseminar: Re:Stolen Contrast Concepts

[From: Bryan Register ]

I think that there is a crucial point of unclarity in the argument I was
trying to attribute to Heidegger, and I want to make sure we're all clear
on it. (I only have a moment, so I'll discuss other, related, issues
later.) William D. says:

>Heidegger makes the error of trying to reverse the crucial
>epistemological asymmetry between the concept of existence and the
>concept of non-existence. ...It's not possible, in
>contrast, to first form the concept "nothing," and then form the concept
>existence. The concept of "nothing" is epistemologically parasitic on
>the concept of existence.

This is not why I think Heidegger is saying. I did not take Heidegger to be
saying that, first we form the concept 'nothing,' then, we form the concept
'being.' Rather, to form any concept at all, we must distinguish its units
from everything else, and then integrate those units. If this is the theory
of concept-formation we want to have, then we're stuck with this theory,
and this theory demands a contrast object for the units of any concept.
Apparently, 'being' is a concept which somehow violates this requirement;
this concept can be formed without the usual process of differentiation and
integration. Heidegger's argument seems to be that there is in fact nothing
special about the concept 'being': Rand will be right, you have to have
contrasts for any concept.

However, this does not commit Heidegger to *reversing* the hierarchy
between 'being' and 'nothing.' Rather, he seems to suggest that the two
come as a pair, that we can grasp neither being nor the nothing without
simultaneously grasping the other (though his point is not about
concept-formation). Whether this argument is successful or not is a
different question, but I want to be careful that we are critiquing the
actual argument and not a subtly different one. So, to repeat: Heidegger
seems to argue for simultaneity of grasping being and the nothing, not for
a hierarchy either different from or identical to the usual hierarchy.

Bryan

Sent: Friday, October 01, 1999 3:10 PM

Subject: Cyberseminar: Re: Commment: Getting a Grip on Nothing -WD

[From: Bryan Register ]

I keep re-reading William D's comments on my essay, and I keep finding that
I can't respond to them. I hope that he can clear up a few things.

William says:

>But what about a contrast object for the concept of existence? As
>strange is it may seem, there is no (conventional) contrast object! ...The
>contrast instead is between conventional facts, which differentiate _some_
>objects from others, and basic facts (or primaries), which focus attention
>on _all_ entities.

I don't think this is going to work. As far as I can see, what William is
suggesting is that the contrast object for 'being' is: particular beings. I
can't see why this would be any different from saying that the contrast
object for 'cat' is: all the cats.

>The need for naming the axiom
>of existence in conceptual terms is to direct attention to it _as a
>primary fact_, (along with identity and consciousness), i.e. a fact that
>lies at the base of epistemology for fallible, volitional beings. As
>with the other primaries, it provides a "regulatory role" in epistemology
>by directing attention to its universality for all knowledge.

Now William is trying to make clearer the claim that particular beings can
be the contrast objects for the concept 'being': this can be the case
because the specific role of the concept 'being' is to call our attention to
being as such, as distinct from any particular beings. But as I understand
things, there is no being as such, only particular beings, and 'being'
refers to each of those beings severally. Moreover, being is not a fact of
any kind; *that* some particular being has some feature is a fact.

>I find Heidegger's invocation of (trying to) imagine non-existence
>fascinating. He invites us to imagine our own non-existence, to thrust
>ourselves into this state, and he suggest we will feel overwhelming dread
>doing so.... Essentially, Heidegger is inviting one to conceptualize a
>contradiction, a contradiction similar to "imagining" a square triangle,
but >on the grand scale of the axioms!

I'm afraid I don't understand. What's the contradiction? Clearly, we must
have a notion of our own death. If we don't have such a notion, then we
don't have any idea what would be an alternative to being alive, and thus
the concept 'life' makes no meaningful distinction for us; it has no
contrast object. Thus, 'life' could no longer be a standard of value because
it would be an invalid concept; a consequence many of you don't look forward
to and which is, besides, plainly false.

>Another thing I can say about this exercise proposed by H is that I think
>Rand would agree with it in trying to understand an H's argument. She
>suggests that one evaluate a philosophical thesis by, "...accept[ing]
>it--for a few brief moments. Tell yourself, in effect: 'If I were to
>accept it as true, what would follow?'....

Again, I don't follow. William seems to be suggesting that there's something
rather obviously nasty which would follow from contemplating the possibility
of one's own death, but I certainly don't know what it is.

Bryan

Sent: Saturday, October 02, 1999 9:26 AM

Subject: Cyberseminar: Imagining nothing
[From: ]

Bryan comments:

> I'm afraid I don't understand. What's the contradiction?

The contradiction is that one can't coherently imagine _from the inside
looking out_ the state of not existing. I don't know how to make it any
clearer. There is no way to use our consciousness to experience
non-consciousness--that's a direct contradiction of what the axioms
represent. It struck me that this is the "dread" H is urging.

> Clearly, we must have a notion of our own death.

Of course we have "a notion" of this, but equally as clearly not in the
way H implies. That notion rests on seeing people alive, seeing them
dead, and knowing what it's like to be alive, not from _experiencing_
being dead. (I wouldn't urge people to try this out.) Bryan's choice of
"notion" here introduces vagarity to obscure the point.

> If we don't have such a notion, then
> we don't have any idea what would be an alternative to being alive, and

> thus the concept 'life' makes no meaningful distinction for us; it has
> no contrast object. Thus, 'life' could no longer be a standard of value
> because it would be an invalid concept; a consequence many of you don't
> look forward to and which is, besides, plainly false.

There is, of course, no need to point out this obviously absurd point.
All we need is to recognize ourselves as mortal beings and observe other
mortal beings dying. We don't, OBVIOUSLY, form this concept by
EXPERIENCING BEING DEAD.

> Again, I don't follow. William seems to be suggesting that there's
> something rather obviously nasty which would follow from contemplating
> the possibility of one's own death, but I certainly don't know what it is.

This is distinctly _not_ what I implied, and certainly not with an
intelligibly sympathetic reading of what I wrote. I do think there is
something obviously nasty about trying to _experience_ the state of being
dead FROM THE FIRST PERSON PERSPECTIVE. This is completely different
from "contemplating the possibility of one's own death." I mentioned
before that I've spent a fair amount of time, likely more time that
others on the list, with people who are dying and trying to come to terms
with this fact. They spend time imagining their own demise, and I can
safely assert that most of them do not look forward to the experience.

Perhaps this helps Bryan understand the distintion I was trying to make.


William

Sent: Sunday, October 03, 1999 3:09 PM

Subject: Cyberseminar: re: Imagining Nothing
[From: Bryan Register ]


Thanks to William D. for clarifying his point that we cannot imagine our own
death:

>The contradiction is that one can't coherently imagine _from the inside
>looking out_ the state of not existing.

However, this leaves me with the questions I started with. 'Death' is a
concept which we form by attending to other organisms and their deaths. So
then we can deduce, rationalistic-style, that we, like other organisms, will
die. I have a feeling that this is not what Heidegger has in mind, and I
also have a feeling that William's cancer patients are not worried about
this abstract eventuality. It seems to me that the very point Heidegger is
trying to make is that we have a more immediate experience of our own
impending death; naturally this does not require us to experience being
dead, but it does require that we have some kind of access to what it
is(n't) like to be dead, else we couldn't feel angst in the face of our
eventual being dead.

To put it another way, if death is not an object which we can experience in
some way (in advance of being dead), then it's not an object we can fear.
(By 'object' here I mean objects in relation to subjects, not physical
objects.) It seems to me that all of the components of our world rushing
away from us and assuming insignificance and absurdity - losing their place
in the teleological hierarchy we've imposed on them - is an apt description
of the kind of experience we *can* have but which is of death.

I don't think the further contemplation of this morbid possibility is going
to bring us much in the way of returns.

Bryan

*************************************************
Fall 1999 Cyberseminar in Objectivist Studies

All Cyberseminar posts are working papers with copyright
reserved to the author. They may not be published or adapted
without permission, but may be circulated for purposes of
scholarly discussion.

*************************************************

Sent: Sunday, October 03, 1999 3:05 PM

Subject: Cyberseminar: Existence
[From: William Dale]

Let me reply to Bryan's concerns about my proposed referents and
contrasts for the axiomatic concept of existence.
He objects to the contrast between the axiomatic concept of existence (or
"being" as he insists) and particular existents. He also rejects the
suggestion that a legitimate contrast exists between various axiomatic
concepts.

Bryan says that "...being is not a fact..." What is the content of
"being" here? Based on what Bryan wrote, I'm taking it to be a
substitutable synonym for the term "existence," representing all
existents. And, if this wasn't clear from my earlier post, I agree with
Bryan that there is no "being as such" if this phrase suggests something
"beyond" all particular existents for Existence.

I never said being "is a fact" as Bryan suggests. I said that (the
axiomatic concept of) Existence was based on the
two distinctions I named (and further describe below), and these
distinctions are based on certain facts about epistemology, namely a
volitional being's need to conceptually identify metaphysical axioms.

As an axiomatic concept, i.e. one that conceptually states a metaphysical
primary, "existence" has a cognitive status unique to these concepts
which separates them from other concepts. It has the special features of
axiomatic concepts such as being implicit in all knowledge and not being
coherently deniable without (at least implicitly) relying on its truth.
These special features are what distinguish these concepts of all other
concepts, and these are the dimensions of differentiation from all other
concepts.

The feature of reality it recognizes is: in any act of knowledge
acquisition, for the axiom of Existence, some feature of reality (or
"being") is attended to. That is, any act of knowledge acquisition
requires one to attend to some aspect _of reality_. If an act of
volitional consciousness does not so attend, then the person is
cognitively disconnected from reality. I want to emphasize that one is
not then in contact with "nothing," if nothing is taken to imply some
metaphysical "thing." Rather, one is failing to have knowledge. The
axiomatic concept's function is as an epistemological reminder that if
one isn't attending to reality, then one is not attending, period. One
of the axiomatic concept's primary roles is to rule out of court the
possibility of "supernatural knowledge." The necessity for any act of
knowledge acquisition to have perceptual content is the fact being
recognized by the axiom of Existence in the form of an axiomatic concept.


Another important distinction is the differences _between_ the axiomatic
concepts of existence, identity, and consciousness. This is a contrast
needed to delineate the different conscious needs of volitional beings in
any act of knowledge acquisition: attention must be focused on real
existents (Existence axiom), one must differentiate based on real features
(Identity axiom), and knowledge requires an act of conscious recognition
(Consciousness axiom). These conscious needs is the dimension of
differentiation.

These two contrasts--1) between features of _any_ act of knowledge
acquisition versus features of a particular act of knowledge acquisition,
and 2) between the axiomatic concepts based on the needs of a volitional
consciousness--are the source for the differentiation of axiomatic
concepts from other concepts and from each other. I don't see any reason
to accept Bryan's insistence that in order to have a concept of
Existence, we are required to either adopt a metaphysical status for
"Nothingness" or jettison our conceptual theory.

William


*************************************************
Fall 1999 Cyberseminar in Objectivist Studies

All Cyberseminar posts are working papers with copyright
reserved to the author. They may not be published or adapted
without permission, but may be circulated for purposes of
scholarly discussion.

*************************************************

Subject: Cyberseminar: Re: Existence
[From: Bryan Register ]


William D. has tried to clarify the axiomatic concept 'existence.' He says:

>I never said being "is a fact" as Bryan suggests.

Not only did William say that existence is a fact in his earlier post:

>The need for naming the axiom
>of existence in conceptual terms is to direct attention to it _as a
>primary fact_, (along with identity and consciousness), i.e. a fact that
>lies at the base of epistemology for fallible, volitional beings.

...he does it again in this post:

>The necessity for any act of knowledge acquisition to have perceptual
>content is the fact being recognized by the axiom of Existence in the form
>of an axiomatic concept.

...and he also implicitly treats it so again in this post:

>It has the special features of axiomatic concepts such as being implicit in
>all knowledge and not being coherently deniable without (at least
>implicitly) relying on its truth.

...by treating (the concept of it) it as the sort of thing that can be true
or false.

I'm not piling this on to win debating points, but to call attention to some
linguistic uses which are, I think, both common and mistaken. The word
'existence,' as I understand it, is a word which is to be used to refer
severally to all things, properties, etc. But no single word expresses a
proposition (asserts a fact, or whatever). You need a whole sentence to do
that.

But let's say (what is likely) that William was indeed trying to talk about
the axiomatic *proposition* that existence exists, and that his usage was
just a slip-up, understandable given this audience. Then I think there's a
deeper issue, which I'll discuss briefly in my next post.

Bryan

*************************************************
Fall 1999 Cyberseminar in Objectivist Studies

All Cyberseminar posts are working papers with copyright
reserved to the author. They may not be published or adapted
without permission, but may be circulated for purposes of
scholarly discussion.

*************************************************

Sent: Friday, October 15, 1999 9:09 AM

Subject: Cyberseminar: Re: "Existence"

[From: Bryan Register ]

(I thought I'd sent this two weeks ago; sorry for the delay.)

Continuing my last argument, about the axiomatic proposition that existence
exists:

As I understand it, a fact is an arrangement of some particular thing or
things and a universal category; the arrangement is the inclusion of the
particular in the universal category. Now, membership for a particular in a
universal category obtains should the particular have the feature the
category members all have. (Or perhaps: should the particular exhibit the
feature which is a member if the category.) In the proposition 'Bessie is a
cat,' 'Bessie' refers to a particular, 'is a' indicates a relation of
category inclusion by the subject in the predicate, and 'cat' refers to the
category in which the referent of the sentence is a member. Bessie is a cat
in virtue of having, as it were, catness. But catness is a property, or set
of properties.

Now, with the axiomatic claim that existence exists, things are less clear.
The word 'existence' refers severally to everything, and the structure of
the sentence indicates category-inclusion by the referent of the subject in
the category referred to by the predicate term where the predicate term has
to be an action verb (like 'Bessie runs'). But now what is that predicate
doing? What is it to say of something that it exists? Rand is clear (and
correct) that existence is not a property of something, so there is
apparently no property possessed by those things which exist and lacked by
those which do not. Ever since Kant, it has been well-known that 'existence'
is not a predicate because existence is not a property. But Kant points this
out in an effort to refute the ontological proof for God, which says that
God, by His very nature, exists - just as Rand (just as mistakenly) says
that existence, by its very nature, exists. There *is no fact* in which the
property possessed by the the referent of the subject term of the sentence
which asserts the fact is existence, because existence is not a property at
all, and so cannot be a property of anything (including existence).

To put it more concretely. If I say "Bashful is," you're none the wiser.
What is this Bashful? "Bashful is a kitten" - now, that's more helpful.
Indeed, in using the name 'Bashful' referringly, I have assumed that that
name refers to something. This is as close as we can get to saying that
something exists. (And, thankfully, predicate calculus doesn't even allow us
to make the mistake I'm trying to correct.)

So I don't know of any cognitive value in this axiomatic concept
'existence', and I'm positively confident that there is no value in saying
of something that it exists. William, however, says why we need the concept
of existence:

>The feature of reality it recognizes is: in any act of knowledge
>acquisition, for the axiom of Existence, some feature of reality (or
>"being") is attended to.

Again, this implicitly treats existence as a fact ('existence' as a
proposition) because it is propositions which assert that some feature is a
feature of reality. But what William is trying to say is of course correct.
Why not say "Consciousness is intrinsically intentional", or "Consciousness
is always about that which is not itself"? That actually says what we want
to say (unlike the way we have tried to say it), and it is equally
self-evident on phenomenological reflection.

Bryan


*************************************************
Fall 1999 Cyberseminar in Objectivist Studies

All Cyberseminar posts are working papers with copyright
reserved to the author. They may not be published or adapted
without permission, but may be circulated for purposes of
scholarly discussion.

*************************************************