Spring 2000 Cyberseminar in Objectivist Studies
Nietzsche and Objectivism

Unit One: January 31 - February 20

Extensive Discussion: "Does Nietzsche Believe in Morality?"
Morality in Friedrich Nietzsche's
Geneology of Morals and Beyond Good and Evil

To: TOC Cyberseminar <cybersem@objectivistcenter.org>

Sent: Friday, February 11, 2000 6:44 PM

Subject: Cyberseminar: Does Nietzsche Believe in Morality?

[From: David L. Potts ]

Does Nietzsche Believe in Morality?


All of the reviewers/commentators so far have taken for granted that
Nietzsche upholds, or seeks to find, a moral code which he would accept as
proper or valid. It may be that he does; I myself have as yet read very
little of Nietzsche and so am not necessarily in a good position to know.
Still, it has seemed to me from the beginning that Nietzsche is challenging
the very idea of a moral code, or at least certain essential aspects of that
idea, and that he is _not_ interested in finding the "right" master morality
with which to replace contemporary mores. In what follows I shall make a
case for this claim.

Nietzsche never speaks, in what I have read, of the need to find a proper
morality - which you would expect him to do if he were really a moralist.

Morality seems bound up with obligation, with codes and rules, and somehow I
don't see the "blond beasts of prey" kowtowing to rules (any more than to a
social contract (GM ii.17)).

In this connection it is worth looking at a very valuable passage, pointed
out by Jason Ticknor-Schwob, in _Twilight of the Idols_, "The 'Improvers' of
Mankind." The passage contains, what I wouldn't have thought possible, a
discussion of a master morality of which Nietzsche disapproves. This is the
Hindu moral code as presented in the book of Manu. It is undeniably master
morality insofar as it imposes a hierarchical ("caste") system upon the
lower orders by the higher. Yet this particular code attempts to breed the
four castes as separate races and therefore looks with abhorrence upon any
interbreeding between castes. The children of such interbreeding,
"chandalas," are treated abominably in an attempt to expunge them from
society, and Nietzsche finds this bad - though what grounds _he_ has for
disapproval elude me. So it is only one aspect of this master morality - its
breeding program - Nietzsche disapproves of; and it is interesting to see a
categorical statement from Nietzsche against the concept of "pure blood."

Most interesting of all, though, is the point of the passage as a whole,
which is that "there are altogether no moral facts" (1). Nietzsche explains
that morality is always just an interpretation, a cultural attitude reified
into truth. This fits well with the doctrine of GM Essay 1 that morals are
the expression of the various _psychologies_ that give rise to them. No
morality, including Nietzsche's, or any that some future Zarathustra might
come up with, has any reality beyond the prejudice of its exponents. (As
such it may still be perhaps a "morality," but not such as to have a claim
on anyone who lacks the relevant prejudices.)

But, finally, and moreover, Nietzsche seems fundamentally uninterested in
discovering rules or guidelines for the improvement or best conduct of
modern people. Rather, what he is interested in is _getting better people_.
His focus seems to be on a future man, not on present conduct.

[--David Potts]


*****************************************************
Spring 2000 Cyberseminar in Objectivist Studies
cybersem@objectivistcenter.org

All Cyberseminar posts are working papers with copyright
reserved to the author. They may not be published or adapted
without permission, but may be circulated for purposes of
scholarly discussion.

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To: TOC Cyberseminar <cybersem@objectivistcenter.org>

To: TOC Cyberseminar <cybersem@objectivistcenter.org>

Sent: Monday, February 14, 2000 10:36 PM

Subject: Cyberseminar: Does Nietzsche Believe in Morality?

[From: Kevin Hill ]

Does Nietzsche seek a moral code? What are we to make of his remarks that
seem to suggest that he rejects the very idea of a moral code?

Part of what Nietzsche objects to in moral codes previously is that while
they can be construed as tools for achieving certain kinds of results, no
moral code construes itself that way. When Nietzsche uses the word "moral"
he *means* "a code which regards itself as requiring something absolutely,
and not as a means to some other end." So on this intrinsicist construal of
the concept of morality, Rand would also be rejecting "morality". (Note how
Nietzsche's account of what morality *is* resembles Kant's, though Nietzsche
rejects what Kant accepts here).

>Morality seems bound up with obligation, with codes and rules, and somehow
>I don't see the "blond beasts of prey" kowtowing to rules (any more than
> to a social contract (GM ii.17)).

The paradigm of "master morality": the Romans (GM I:16). And they have a
very lively appreciation of property rights, rules, obligations, etc. as
Nietzsche knew well (the entire American political system could be said to
be a further development of the Roman Republican model). Masters are also
"show themselves so resourceful in consideration, self-control, delicacy,
loyalty, pride and friendship" and it is only when they "go outside [the
community]" that they become "not much better than uncaged beats of prey"
(GM I:11). Nietzsche even goes so far as to say that the very ideas of law
and justice are "master" ideas (GM II:11). The reference to the social
contract here claims, along with Hume, that the social contract cannot
explain the historical *origin* of the *state*. It does not imply that among
masters there can be no contracts or rules.

>In this connection it is worth looking at a very valuable passage, pointed
>out by Jason Ticknor-Schwob, in _Twilight of the Idols_, "The 'Improvers'
>of Mankind."

This points to a danger in reading GM--to assume that because Nietzsche is
for X, Y and Z that X, Y and Z are features or aspects of the same thing,
while because Nietzsche disapproves of A, B and C, A, B and C must be
features of some other one thing. But as Nietzsche makes clear in GM I,
there are *two* different varieties of master morality: "knightly" and
"priestly" (GM I:6-7), though our priest-masters contrived slave morality
and used it to prevail. But not all priests create and use slave morality:
the Hindu Brahmins, for example, did not. So it is important to not miss the
*complexity* of the analysis and resist the temptation to reduce it to two
columns.

>Most interesting of all, though, is the point of the passage as a whole,
>which is that "there are altogether no moral facts" (1).

Again, I think that this is best understood as "there are no irreducible,
independent of consequence or function absolute obligations". That leaves
open the possibility that certain rules might be useful for generating
certain results (including certain kinds of people) the value of which may
very well be "objective."

>
>But, finally, and moreover, Nietzsche seems fundamentally uninterested in
>discovering rules or guidelines for the improvement or best conduct of
>modern people. Rather, what he is interested in is _getting better people_.

This is a false alternative: if your goal is to get better people, and all
you have to work with are modern people, then you would want rules that
would, when followed by *some* modern people, increase the likelihood of the
production of better people. The importance of a discipline to get this
result is suggested in Zarathustra's Prologue, as well as in BGE 188.
Present conduct produces the future man.

[Kevin Hill]


*****************************************************
Spring 2000 Cyberseminar in Objectivist Studies
cybersem@objectivistcenter.org

All Cyberseminar posts are working papers with copyright
reserved to the author. They may not be published or adapted
without permission, but may be circulated for purposes of
scholarly discussion.

*****************************************************

 

To: TOC Cyberseminar <cybersem@objectivistcenter.org>

Sent: Thursday, February 17, 2000 3:37 PM

Subject: Cyberseminar: Re: Does Nietzsche Believe in Morality?

[From: David L. Potts]

Kevin writes:

> >But, finally, and moreover, Nietzsche seems fundamentally uninterested in
> >discovering rules or guidelines for the improvement or best conduct of
> >modern people. Rather, what he is interested in is _getting better
people_.
>
> This is a false alternative: if your goal is to get better people, and all
> you have to work with are modern people, then you would want rules that
> would, when followed by *some* modern people, increase the likelihood of
the
> production of better people. The importance of a discipline to get this
> result is suggested in Zarathustra's Prologue, as well as in BGE 188.
> Present conduct produces the future man.

I didn't present an "alternative" or suggest that the two goals are mutually
exclusive. I asserted that Nietzsche as a matter of fact is interested in
one thing and not in another. Whether my assertion is really true I hope to
discover in time. As my reading continues, however, I have still found no
reason to doubt it. Certainly there is nothing in BGE 188 to suggest that
Nietzsche thinks that some one code of virtues or morals is better than any
other - for producing the better people of the future or for any other
reason - or even that virtue _per se_ is better for producing better people
than any other form of "slavery." Indeed, this whole passage rather supports
my point that what Nietzsche seems interested in is promoting the
development of better people, without regard to any specific morality or
even _type_ of morality. (As for "Zarathustra's Prologue," it's relevance to
your point escapes me, I'm afraid.)

Let me recapitulate - if possible with greater clarity - the three reasons I
gave in my original post to doubt that Nietzsche is looking for the "right"
master morality. First, an "empirical" reason: we don't see him moralize.
Moralists articulate specific moral guidelines, search for moral truths,
attempt to define moral terms, examine problem cases to determine
appropriate courses of action and test the adequacy of their prescriptions,
offer codes of virtues, and the like. Nietzsche does none of this.

Second, he says that morals are expressions of the psychologies of the
people who characteristically hold them (e.g., GM i.2,10; BGE 260). This
implies that morals are effects, not causes. It doesn't look like one gets
to be noble by adhering to the right code; rather, _if_ one is noble then
_eo ipso_ one's code becomes right.

Finally, following codes just isn't in the masters' line. The masters
_create_ values. This means both that they create social standards and
codes, which they impose on the "herd" (GM ii.17-18), and also that they
create their _own_ values. It's not that they have no virtues or duties, but
they have their own, even _personal_ duties (cf. BGE 272). Being the result
of uniquely creative acts, these values/duties necessarily vary from one
master to another and from one generation to another. And obviously, they
cannot be anticipated. If so, there can never be a recommended code of
master morality.

-David

 

To: TOC Cyberseminar <cybersem@objectivistcenter.org>

Sent: Sunday, February 20, 2000 10:24 PM

Subject: Cyberseminar: Re: Does Nietzsche Believe in Morality?

[From: Thomas Gramstad ]

David Potts wrote, on Feb. 17 2000:

> Let me recapitulate - if possible with greater clarity - the
> three reasons I gave in my original post to doubt that Nietzsche
> is looking for the "right" master morality. First, an
> "empirical" reason: we don't see him moralize. Moralists
> articulate specific moral guidelines, search for moral truths,
> attempt to define moral terms, examine problem cases to
> determine appropriate courses of action and test the adequacy of
> their prescriptions, offer codes of virtues, and the like.
> Nietzsche does none of this.

Aside from Nietzsche's resistance against universal codes and
rules, there is also the issue that he wants people to choose,
develop and expand healthy, vital instincts, so that people can
function and make decisions swiftly and automatically by relying
on their (healthy and vital) subconscious. This raises the
interesting question: Can there be subconscious moralities?

Even if one decides that a subconscious act or decision process
itself cannot be designated as a moral decision or choice, there
still remains the issue of deliberate "training" and directing of
the subconscious. When this training/directing is done
deliberately, i.e., consciously, in order to reach certain moral
ends and as a means of implementing a decision process, then this
seems to qualify as a morality.

> Second, he says that morals are expressions of the psychologies
> of the people who characteristically hold them (e.g., GM i.2,10;
> BGE 260). This implies that morals are effects, not causes. It
> doesn't look like one gets to be noble by adhering to the right
> code; rather, _if_ one is noble then _eo ipso_ one's code
> becomes right.

I disagree with this. The third possibility is that it's not the
one or the other, but instead is a complex, mutual, bicausal
relationship: both the code and the self have causal properties,
and they also each have effects caused by the other. The self
must choose and embrace the code; then the code can influence the
self; the changed self must continue to choose and embrace the
code, and soforth. Also, a malevolent self can corrupt the code,
or a benevolent self may correct weaknesses in the code and
develop it further.

> Finally, following codes just isn't in the masters' line. The
> masters _create_ values. This means both that they create social
> standards and codes, which they impose on the "herd" (GM
> ii.17-18),

I think that's a historical description of how things used to
work. Nietzsche's personal view is that the Free Spirit, or child
stage, or creator, has no need to impose anything on other people,
but is self-sufficient. Don't have the books here now, but this
point is also made in online sources..
If others will follow, they follow. If they want to do their own
thing, they do their own thing.

> and also that they create their _own_ values. It's not that they
> have no virtues or duties, but they have their own, even
> _personal_ duties (cf. BGE 272). Being the result of uniquely
> creative acts, these values/duties necessarily vary from one
> master to another and from one generation to another. And
> obviously, they cannot be anticipated. If so, there can never be
> a recommended code of master morality.

But even then there could be social practices, customs and
institutions teaching how to, say, train one's subconscious; how
to develop and vitalize one's instincts; how to build and exercize
courage; how to incorporate habits that aid the accomplishment of
these ends; and soforth.

Besides, even if everybody had their own master/creator code,
there would still be similarities, based on the fact that they are
still all the same species, homo sapiens. There wouldn't suddenly
arise Martian or Alpha Centaurian mutant master moralities out of
nowhere.
- Thomas
Thomas Gramstad
"You can re-create yourself, every second of your life."
-- Xena, _Forgiven_

*****************************************************
Spring 2000 Cyberseminar in Objectivist Studies
cybersem@objectivistcenter.org

All Cyberseminar posts are working papers with copyright
reserved to the author. They may not be published or adapted
without permission, but may be circulated for purposes of
scholarly discussion.

*****************************************************



 

To: TOC Cyberseminar <cybersem@objectivistcenter.org>

Sent: Sunday, February 20, 2000 10:25 PM

Subject: Cyberseminar: Re: Does Nietzsche Believe in Morality?

[From: Thomas Gramstad ]

David Potts wrote, on Feb. 11 2000:

> Does Nietzsche Believe in Morality?
[...]
> Nietzsche never speaks, in what I have read, of the need to find
> a proper morality - which you would expect him to do if he were
> really a moralist.
>
> Morality seems bound up with obligation, with codes and rules,
> and somehow I don't see the "blond beasts of prey" kowtowing to
> rules (any more than to a social contract (GM ii.17)).
[...]
> Most interesting of all, though, is the point of the passage as
> a whole, which is that "there are altogether no moral facts"
> (1). Nietzsche explains that morality is always just an
> interpretation, a cultural attitude reified into truth. This
> fits well with the doctrine of GM Essay 1 that morals are the
> expression of the various _psychologies_ that give rise to
> them. No morality, including Nietzsche's, or any that some
> future Zarathustra might come up with, has any reality beyond
> the prejudice of its exponents. (As such it may still be perhaps
> a "morality," but not such as to have a claim on anyone who
> lacks the relevant prejudices.)

This raises the question, "What is a morality?" and also, "What
was Nietzsche's context, what was he reacting against?".
Nietzsche was reacting against the universal Reason of Hegel (as
opposed to an individual and situated reason, such as we find in
Rand) and the universal collectivist altruism associated with
universal Reason (which found its ultimate expression in Kant's
ethics). So, for Nietzsche, morality meant universal codes and
rules, independent of individual contexts and purposes. This is
what he rejected and rebelled against (and so far Rand agrees and
did the same).

This is not the morality concept that we find in Rand, but it is
also not the morality concept that the ancients (Greeks and
Romans) had, they had a more individualist but also aristocratic
and elitist morality. In other words, one may get the idea from
the ancients, as Nietzsche must have done, that one can have
moralities that are not for all. One can have moralities that
apply to just a few select people, perhaps even a morality only
for one person, oneself. These aristocrat elitist (master)
moralities are, or at least can be, moralities without moralism.

And this may explain why Nietzsche did not look for moral rules
for everyone, and was not a moralist -- and why this by itself
does not disqualify him from having a morality.

I'm not saying that Nietzsche necessarily had a morality, only
that this question cannot be settled by the method and type of
questions/arguments used by David above.

- Thomas
Thomas Gramstad
"Our society won't be truly free until "None of the Above" is
always an option." -- Eric S. Raymond


*****************************************************
Spring 2000 Cyberseminar in Objectivist Studies
cybersem@objectivistcenter.org

All Cyberseminar posts are working papers with copyright
reserved to the author. They may not be published or adapted
without permission, but may be circulated for purposes of
scholarly discussion.

*****************************************************

 

To: TOC Cyberseminar <cybersem@objectivistcenter.org>

Sent: Thursday, February 24, 2000 12:13 AM

Subject: Cyberseminar: Re: Does Nietzsche Believe in Morality?

[From: David L. Potts ]

Thomas writes:

> Aside from Nietzsche's resistance against universal codes and
> rules, there is also the issue that he wants people to choose,
> develop and expand healthy, vital instincts, so that people can
> function and make decisions swiftly and automatically by relying
> on their (healthy and vital) subconscious. This raises the
> interesting question: Can there be subconscious moralities?

Surely not. A moral code is a _code_. The whole idea is to find _principles_
for conduct. The possibility that a person's subconscious could be trained,
by somebody _else_, say, to function better or to achieve proper ends, does
not avoid the problem. The question simply becomes what the training or the
ideal subconscious functioning _ought_ to be. The answer must make reference
to principles. If Nietzsche is not searching for, articulating, defining,
testing such principles, then he is not doing the work of a moralist.

I appreciate the counterintuitiveness of saying that Nietzsche, who talks
constantly about morality, and who continually judges and evaluates, was
uninterested in articulating a proper moral code. But I have already given
my reasons for thinking it true.

But let me raise a point against my own view. It is true that in some
passages Nietzsche sounds pretty relativistic. Cf. BGE 260 on master and
slave moralities, or the analogy of the large birds of prey and the little
lambs (GM i.13); in these passages Nietzsche conspicuously fails to present
these moralities, including the masters', as anything more than
codifications of the interests and prejudices of their respective
proponents. Still, to set Nietzsche down as simply a relativist is surely a
mistake. For he seems to have a small set of what we might call
"metavalues," by which he seems to assess moral codes. These would include
health (e.g., GM iii.14), strength (e.g., BGE 62), and life (GM Preface 5).
These are values Nietzsche never treats as arbitrary and which he assumes
his men of the future will vindicate (GM ii.24; cf. BGE 44, 203). Perhaps
these, then, might form at least the core or the basis of a morality.

Why then doesn't Nietzsche defend these "metavalues" explicitly and try to
build a moral code upon them? I suspect the answer is that a philosopher who
holds that even the laws of physics are merely interpretations, not matters
of fact (BGE 22), that even causation _per se_ is something we have no
objective, rational basis to believe in (BGE 21), is in no position to claim
that health is an objective value.

I wonder also whether being in a jam this severe isn't the reason he pins
his hopes on "philosophers of the future," whose "'knowing' is _creating_,
their creating is a legislation." (BGE 211, emphasis original). If this is
so, then we should take Nietzsche at his word when he denies (BGE 44) being
himself one of the "new philosophers" who will revalue all values (BGE 203).
If it isn't only God but also truth (the _worth_ of truth) in which we can
no longer believe (GM iii.27), we will require a very radical new beginning
indeed - and I am suggesting Nietzsche admits he doesn't have it.

-David


*****************************************************
Spring 2000 Cyberseminar in Objectivist Studies
cybersem@objectivistcenter.org

All Cyberseminar posts are working papers with copyright
reserved to the author. They may not be published or adapted
without permission, but may be circulated for purposes of
scholarly discussion.

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To: TOC Cyberseminar <cybersem@objectivistcenter.org>

Sent: Thursday, February 17, 2000 11:17 PM

Subject: Cyberseminar: Friends, Romans, Countrymen [Master Social Ethics]

[From: David L. Potts ]

Friends, Romans, Countrymen

Kevin writes:

> The paradigm of "master morality": the Romans (GM I:16). And they have a
> very lively appreciation of property rights, rules, obligations, etc. as
> Nietzsche knew well.
> Masters also
> "show themselves so resourceful in consideration, self-control, delicacy,
> loyalty, pride and friendship" and it is only when they "go outside [the
> community]" that they become "not much better than uncaged beats of prey"
> (GM I:11).

It is important to be clear that Nietzsche himself does not attribute to the
Romans a lively appreciation for rules. Rather, the Romans' putative
appreciation for rules is something Kevin is saying Nietzsche would have
been happy to acknowledge as a master race characteristic. But even if he
would have acknowledged it, the question remains what grounds Nietzsche
could adduce for doing so.

This raises the question of how it is possible, within Nietzsche's "system,"
for the masters to be social animals. The masters after all are aggressive,
dynamic, spontaneous, free, strong, and willful. Therefore, being
considerate, self-controlled, delicate, and friendly would seem to be out of
character. Moreover, he says outright that "the confines of society and
peace" (GM ii.16), by forcing us to internalize our innate and universal
animosity, cruelty, and urge for destruction, are the source of bad
conscience. How then can it be possible for the masters to avoid bad
conscience?

The first part of the answer seems to be that the masters can_not_ be
entirely comfortable in society. The blond beast of prey is not vanquished
but still lurks in the hearts of the "noble races" even today, and it "needs
release from time to time, the beast must out again, must return to the
wild" (GM i.11), as a result of which we must continually fear the master
races and what they might do.

But how can the masters get along between themselves? The answer seems to be
that there is a natural sort of good will between persons whose power is
roughly equal (GM ii.8; BGE 259, 265). To injure, exploit, commit violence
upon one's true peers, it seems, lacks "good manners" (BGE 259). But this
cannot be a universal arrangement. The strong, even in society, must violate
and brutalize other people in order to stay living and vital, since that
_is_ the principle of life.

So the answer to the question how the masters can be civil is, first, that
they _can't_, entirely, though they try, and second, that their civility is
extended mainly only to one another, out of their sense of decorum.

But where does this sense of decorum come from? Nietzsche's answer is that
the reverence which each master feels for _himself_ is extended by a sort of
sympathetic reaction to others of his own rank (BGE 265). As to the
plausibility of _this_, I suppose it depends on how reasonable you think it
is to suppose (BGE 260, 263) that "reverence" is a characteristic master
emotion.

-David


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Spring 2000 Cyberseminar in Objectivist Studies
cybersem@objectivistcenter.org

All Cyberseminar posts are working papers with copyright
reserved to the author. They may not be published or adapted
without permission, but may be circulated for purposes of
scholarly discussion.

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To: TOC Cyberseminar <cybersem@objectivistcenter.org>

Sent: Sunday, February 20, 2000 10:26 PM

Subject: Cyberseminar: Re: Friends, Romans, Countrymen [Master Social Ethics]

[From: Thomas Gramstad ]

David Potts wrote, on Feb. 17 2000:

> But where does this sense of decorum come from? Nietzsche's
> answer is that the reverence which each master feels for
> _himself_ is extended by a sort of sympathetic reaction to
> others of his own rank (BGE 265). As to the plausibility of
> _this_, I suppose it depends on how reasonable you think it is
> to suppose (BGE 260, 263) that "reverence" is a characteristic
> master emotion.

...and that depends on how reasonable you think it is to suppose
that masters are violent blond beasts.

- Thomas
Thomas Gramstad
"Think like a man of action, and act like a man of thought."
-- Henri Bergson


*****************************************************
Spring 2000 Cyberseminar in Objectivist Studies
cybersem@objectivistcenter.org

All Cyberseminar posts are working papers with copyright
reserved to the author. They may not be published or adapted
without permission, but may be circulated for purposes of
scholarly discussion.

*****************************************************

To: TOC Cyberseminar <cybersem@objectivistcenter.org>

Sent: Sunday, February 20, 2000 10:28 PM

Subject: Cyberseminar: Re: Friends, Romans, Countrymen [Master Social Ethics]

[From: Kevin Hill ]

>Date: Thu, 17 Feb 2000 23:17:17 -0500
>
>
>[From: David L. Potts ]
>
>Friends, Romans, Countrymen [snip]

I think David and I were talking past each other--there's very little to
disagree with in his post as I see it. The Roman appreciation for order,
courtesy, etc. while avoiding the bad conscience, is possible, on
Nietzsche's view, precisely because the aggressive stuff finds outlet
elsewhere--in war, pillage, etc. So I think he would say that to maintain
the internal structure, with its partially attractive features, the system
as a whole must be constantly expanding through conquest, with all the
unattractive features of that. I was not trying to suggest that the masters,
or the Romans, were soft and cuddly--far from it. What Nietzsche misses, and
Rand sees, is that there is a third way: a culture based on *exchange*. And
without the third way, buying into either master or slave morality will end
up bringing its "opposite" along in its train (cf. Gail Wynnand, the figure
of the leash, etc.)

As for the "reverence" issue, one point that Nietzsche recurs to elsewhere
is that masters are big on commanding *and* obeying (presumably because of
the *military* values their culture depends upon--unless you are a
footsoldier or Caesar, every militarized Roman both commands and obeys).
Slaves, by contrast, wish to abolish both commanding and obeying altogether
in favor of "equality".

[Kevin Hill]


*****************************************************
Spring 2000 Cyberseminar in Objectivist Studies
cybersem@objectivistcenter.org

All Cyberseminar posts are working papers with copyright
reserved to the author. They may not be published or adapted
without permission, but may be circulated for purposes of
scholarly discussion.

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To: TOC Cyberseminar <cybersem@objectivistcenter.org>

Sent: Thursday, February 24, 2000 12:11 AM

Subject: Cyberseminar: Will Herd Members "Do Their Own Thing"?

[From: David L. Potts ]

Will Herd Members "Do Their Own Thing"?


Thomas writes:

> > The
> > masters _create_ values. This means both that they create social
> > standards and codes, which they impose on the "herd" (GM
> > ii.17-18),
>
> I think that's a historical description of how things used to
> work. Nietzsche's personal view is that the Free Spirit, or child
> stage, or creator, has no need to impose anything on other people,
> but is self-sufficient.
> If others will follow, they follow. If they want to do their own
> thing, they do their own thing.

Are we both reading the same Nietzsche? :-)

In all seriousness, it sounds like you are saying that the masters in a
Nietzschean paradise would only lead by suggestion and any herd members
would be allowed to "do their own thing" if they want. But let us just
remind ourselves that "the essential characteristic of a good and healthy
aristocracy.[includes that it] accepts with a good conscience the sacrifice
of untold human beings who, _for its sake_, must be reduced and lowered to
incomplete human beings, to slaves, to instruments" (BGE 258, emphasis
original) and that "egoism belongs to the nature of a noble soul - I mean
that unshakeable faith that to a being such as 'we are' other beings must be
subordinate by nature and have to sacrifice themselves" (BGE 265). Further,
Nietzsche says that he wishes Europe would "_acquire one will_ by means of a
new caste that would rule Europe" (BGE 208, emphasis original).

The context of these passages shows that they are meant politically; it is
not just "spiritual" domination that is in question. When Nietzsche says, as
he often does (BGE 44, 188, 239), that slavery is necessary for the
enhancement of man, it is often clear that he means "slavery" at least
partly in what he calls a "subtle" (i.e., spiritual, intellectual) sense.
However, that should not blind us to the fact that usually the context shows
that he _also_ means it in, as he says (BGE 188), the "cruder" sense. For
instance, at BGE 44 the contrast is to "equality of rights" in the paragraph
immediately preceding his mention of slavery.

Perhaps there is a difference between the Nietzsche who is so ready to talk
about noble races, classes, "blood" - deploring intermarriage for example as
a source of sickness and degeneration (BGE 200, 208, 224, 261) - and the
Nietzsche who talks about the noble souls as primarily spiritual (BGE 287),
as individuals who may be very few (BGE 126, 200), who may overcome lower
class origins (BGE 61), who are delicate and vulnerable (BGE 62, 203, 274),
and who are difficult to identify (BGE 274, 287). But this only means that
Nietzsche recognizes that not every member of the master class will be truly
noble, and even that true nobility can emerge from anywhere. It is to his
credit that he takes the side of nobility in the case of conflicts; but this
should not blind us to the true nature of what he is advocating.

-David


*****************************************************
Spring 2000 Cyberseminar in Objectivist Studies
cybersem@objectivistcenter.org

All Cyberseminar posts are working papers with copyright
reserved to the author. They may not be published or adapted
without permission, but may be circulated for purposes of
scholarly discussion.

*****************************************************

To: TOC Cyberseminar <cybersem@objectivistcenter.org>

Sent: Thursday, February 24, 2000 2:42 PM

Subject: Cyberseminar: Re: Will Herd Members "Do Their Own Thing"?

[From: Kevin Hill ]

[Potts]
>The context of these passages shows that they are meant politically; it is
>not just "spiritual" domination that is in question. When Nietzsche says,
>as
>he often does (BGE 44, 188, 239), that slavery is necessary for the
>enhancement of man, it is often clear that he means "slavery" at least
>partly in what he calls a "subtle" (i.e., spiritual, intellectual) sense.
>However, that should not blind us to the fact that usually the context
>shows
>that he _also_ means it in, as he says (BGE 188), the "cruder" sense. For
>instance, at BGE 44 the contrast is to "equality of rights" in the
>paragraph
>immediately preceding his mention of slavery.

Hill:
Though I applaud the emphasis that Nietzsche's notion of "slavery" in this
context is not merely spiritual, matters become muddled when we ask what he
means in acknowledging the existence of "slavery" in a cruder sense. This is
because Nietzsche regards the perfection of the economic system as the
reduction of the majority to a condition tantamount to "slavery" [WP 866].
If this passage is taken in conjunction with the passage on the inevitable
triumph of the forces of privatization over the state in Human I:472, along
with countless passages condemning the state elsewhere, then one might infer
that Nietzsche regards the achievement of new "slavery" as equivalent to the
replacement of the state by private, economic organizations, the reduction
of all to the status of employee. The fact that the new "masters" benefit
from this productivity does not necessarily imply that the exploit
coercively through a state apparatus. For example, they might accept
donations from successful businessmen to found research institutes in
Poughkeepsie NY. Thus they may very well "rule" in nothing more than a
spiritual sense--defining what people should value (which fits with
Nietzsche's *constant* attack on the state during all phases of his thought)
while at the same time benefitting from an economic arrangement that *he*
regarded as little more than slavery in a new guise. My point is that one
can endorse the claim that the "exploitation" is material, not spiritual,
without assuming that it is *political*, since this is incompatible with
slews of quotes condemning the state (cf. "Use and Abuse of History",
"Glance at the State" in _Human_, "New Idol" in _Zarathustra_, for
starters). But this topic should really be discussed under the rubric of
Nietzsche's politics, later on.

[Kevin Hill]


*****************************************************
Spring 2000 Cyberseminar in Objectivist Studies
cybersem@objectivistcenter.org

All Cyberseminar posts are working papers with copyright
reserved to the author. They may not be published or adapted
without permission, but may be circulated for purposes of
scholarly discussion.

*****************************************************

To: TOC Cyberseminar <cybersem@objectivistcenter.org>

Sent: Friday, February 25, 2000 2:19 PM

Subject: Cyberseminar: Re: Will Herd Members "Do Their Own Thing"?

[From: David L. Potts ]
Kevin Hill writes (I've edited slightly):

>...the passage on the inevitable
>triumph of the forces of privatization over the state in Human I:472, along
>with countless passages condemning the state elsewhere, [implies]
>that Nietzsche regards the achievement of new "slavery" as equivalent to
the
>replacement of the state by private, economic organizations, the reduction
>of all to [a condition tantamount to "slavery" (WP 866)]...

Your response is reasonable enough. Your thesis is intriguing and it will be
interesting to see whether it can be sustained by the texts. I trust I will
be forgiven if, at my present state of reading, it strikes me as quixotic.
In the two of Nietzsche's philosophical Frazetta paintings I've read so far
(GM and BGE), he heaps abundant scorn upon democracy and "equality of
rights" but never on the state per se.

But, as you say, this topic is best discussed when we get to part 3 of the
cyberseminar.

-David


*****************************************************
Spring 2000 Cyberseminar in Objectivist Studies
cybersem@objectivistcenter.org

All Cyberseminar posts are working papers with copyright
reserved to the author. They may not be published or adapted
without permission, but may be circulated for purposes of
scholarly discussion.

*****************************************************