Fall 1999 Cyberseminar in Objectivist Studies:
"The Continental Origins of Postmodernism"

Week 1: September 13-19 through Week 4: October 4-October 10

DEFINING POSTMODERNISM

Sent: Friday, September 17, 1999 3:48 PM

Subject: Cyberseminar: Defining "Postmodernism"

[From: William Thomas ]

The American Heritage Dictionary, 3rd Edition, defines Postmodernism on the
basis of its definition of:

Postmodern: adj. Of or relating to art, architecture, or literature that
reacts against earlier modernist principles, as by reintroducing
traditional or classical elements of style or by carrying modernist styles
or practices to extremes: "The post-modern mode of tapering the tops of
buildings" (Jane Holtz Kay).

This, in a nutshell, presents us with the problem of knowing what we are
talking about when we talk of Postmodernism.

In literary theory, it is associated with Deconstruction, Queer theory, and
a general denigration of the idea that there should be standards, or that
literary analysis can in any way or should in any way be objective.

In architecture, it is associated with an eclecticism that partakes of many
traditional design elements, as opposed to the rigid standards of the
international style of modern architecture (e.g. Mies Van Der Rohe).

In Art, it is associated with non-traditional forms of sculpture, such as
environmental art, and with various forms of performance art.

In Music, it appears to be about a return to accessibility and a certain
eclecticism about adapting historical styles.

I am offering these observations as a way to help lay out the territory
that has to be defined.

Is there a principle behind the reaction to Modernism? Or is the reaction
composed, as I think must be the case, of radically different camps.
Perhaps we should be explicit in stating that Postmodernism is, for us, the
new collection of "cultural critiques" now entrenched in literary criticism
and "cultural studies" programs.

I am not offering a definition here, because I am still groping to isolate
the CCDs of the current term. There is the criterion of REACTION AGAINST
MODERNISM. There is ECLECTICISM as a principle, or the DENIAL OF
OBJECTIVITY. And then there is the content of the cultural critique: group
rights, ethical relativism, environmentalism, anti-capitalism.

I invite the participants of the cyberseminar to offer their analyses of
"Postmodernism." It will help us know where we are starting from, and
where we are going over the course of the term.


--Will Thomas

William Thomas
Manager of Research & Training,
The Objectivist Center

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Sent: Friday, September 17, 1999 4:03 PM

Subject: Cyberseminar: "What is Postmodernism?"

[From Bryan Register]

David K. proposes that one worthwhile question to ask is "Rand's Question"
about the concept 'postmodernism.' I thought I would take a very brief
stab, based on characterizations I've seen of postmodern literature and its
relation to postmodern theory.

The work I've looked at indicates that there are actually at least two
closely related concepts: there is postmodern*ity*, and also
postmodern*ism*. These take as their direct contrasts, respectively,
modernity and modernism. The adjective 'postmodern' is applied to anything
in a culture which is evidence of that culture instantiating postmodernity.
These things are, of course, also what the postmodernity of the culture
consists of. Thus there is 'postmodern literature' and 'postmodern theory.'
This last is what is called 'postmodernism,' because, being a theory, a
postmodern theory is an -ism. There is also an alternate usage of
'modernism' and 'postmodernism', wherein a particular theory is a modernism
or a postmodernism; so Kantianism might be a modernism, while Nietzsche's
philosophy might be the first postmodernism.

Modernity and postmodernity are thought of as cultural conditions, and the
marks of these cultural conditions are to be found in a culture's
literature, journalism, law, science, humane studies, and so on. Modernism
and postmodernism are thought of as kinds of theoretical approaches;
specifically, the kind of theoretical approaches which try to understand
modernity or postmodernity and which are themselves instances of modernity
or postmodernity showing itself in the culture. Postmodernism is
postmodernity showing itself in the humanities, just as modernism was
modernity's version of humane studies.

Modernity is marked, by these postmodernists, by (at least) three features.

1) The desire to overcome prejudice and achieve objectivity.
2) The notion that progress was here to stay.
3) A set of distinctions which were supposed to make it so that we overcame
prejudice and retained progress.

The first idea is best seen in Kant's 'What is Enlightenment?', which
answers that Enlightenment is a critical mentality which persists in
questioning dogma until it is either proved or gotten rid of. Objectivism,
of course, is a modern philosophy (a modernism) by this criterion.

The second idea is best seen in Hegel and Marx. For both of these thinkers,
there is an underlying force moving the world, and the direction it is
taking us is good. This modern confidence in worldly progress was supposed
to replace the pre-modern confidence in otherwordly salvation. I have seen
many a writer propose that this modern idea has definitively gone down in
flames; Auschwitz' flames. Objectivism is not a modern philosophy by this
criterion, because Objectivism's indeterminism allows that progress is not
necessary but merely contingent (on human choice).

The third idea is also best seen in Kant. Fact-value, subject-object (i.e.,
self-world), mind-body, and so forth are all distinctions best formalized
in Kant. These pairings have been the common currency of most modern
schools of thought; that is, most modernisms have agreed to the common
matrix of the Kantian distinctions (that's why they're modernisms). One
semi-formal definition I've seen of postmodernism is that it is 'theory
which breaks down the untenable dualities of modernism', with a litany of
examples following. Objectivism is apparently postmodern (is a
postmodernism) by this criterion. Actually, the first condition, but for
its salience, should be seen as an instance of this third condition.
Modernism dichotomized objectivity and prejudice, postmodernism rejects the
dichotomy.

So postmodernism is a feature of postmodernity. Postmodernity takes
modernity as its contrast object. The dimensions along which the two differ
are their view of prejudice and objectivity, their optimism about progress,

and their acceptance of the litany of modernist dichotomies stemming
largely from Kant (and a few other places and phenomena). Their conceptual
common denominator is that they are (kinds of) cultures.

Bryan

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To: TOC Cyberseminar <cybersem@objectivistcenter.org>

Sent: Sunday, September 19, 1999 6:11 PM

Subject: Cyberseminar: Defining "Postmodernism"

[From Roger Donway]

To define "postmodernism" correctly, I think we might best separate the task
into two parts: (1) define the concept "postmodernism" in the context of
several fields; (2) determine if all or some of those concepts have
sufficient similarity to justify a higher-level concept of "postmodernism."
I do not think we can assume that there is one concept of "postmodernism"
that is employed univocally in several fields, or that there is a
genus-level concept of "postmodernism" possessing several validly formed
species-level concepts.

This two-step approach is frequently found in dictionaries, that is, the
genus-level concept will be defined, then the species-level concepts.

1. general definition; hence
   2. in field (a),
   3. in field (b),
   4. in field (c),
   And so on.
   

>From the stand-point of concept-formation, however, it would seem preferable
to move in the opposite direction.
1. in field (a),
2. in field (b),
3. in field (c),
4. hence, generally, ...

Of course, it might turn out that the concepts defined in (1), (2), and (3)
are so different that no genus-level concept can be formed. Or the
similarity may be so slight as to leave us with a concept of scant utility.
Thus, the word "cat," in broadest sense, could be defined as "the domestic
feline animal or anything thought to resemble one."

Now, because I know little of contemporary art, architecture, or literary
studies--fields in which the term "postmodernism" is frequently used--I
shall confine my efforts to defining it in the field of philosophy. And to
do so, I shall place postmodernism in the context of a broad-brush history
of philosophy.

What is commonly called Modern philosophy--Hobbes to Hume, the late
Renaissance through the Enlightenment--was in essence a period of
epistemological realism. It was followed by nineteenth-century idealism, in
a wide variety of forms. Idealism, in turn, was superseded in the twentieth
century by both a modest realism (actually representationalism) and a modest
idealism, which tried to make the coherence theory of meaning and truth more
respectful of science.

Postmodernism attempts to get beyond the realist versus idealist,
primacy-of-existence versus primacy-of-consciousness dichotomies, and to do
so it sets forth what I take to be its defining tenet in philosophy. Thus, I
would say: "postmodernism," in philosophy, is the doctrine that language is
simply one form of social behavior among many and the characteristics of
language (for example, meaning and truth) are determined by the world-view
of the speaker's group, such as those groups characterized (in whole or
part) by sex, race, class, nationality, age, era, and so forth.

If that is accurate, the term "postmodern" is apt. For although Idealism was
the first literal post-Modern philosophy, it retained (to varying degrees) a
belief in objectivity and universality, key elements of the Modern outlook.
Postmodernism rejects those elements.

[Roger Donway]

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To: TOC Cyberseminar <cybersem@objectivistcenter.org>

Sent: Monday, September 20, 1999 7:42 AM

Subject: Fw: Cyberseminar: Defining "Postmodernism"

[From: Bryan Register ]

Roger Donway proposes that

>"postmodernism," in philosophy, is the doctrine that language is
>simply one form of social behavior among many and the characteristics of
>language (for example, meaning and truth) are determined by the world-view
>of the speaker's group, such as those groups characterized (in whole or
>part) by sex, race, class, nationality, age, era, and so forth.

I'm afraid that I don't see the problem. For one thing, many analytic
philosophers of language, following Wittgenstein's lead, agree that language
is but one form of social behavior; the production of speech acts is no
different in principle from the production of any other socially defined
act, such as moving a knight in chess. So the account seems to include
Wittgenstein, Austin, Searle, and a pile of other non-postmodernists.

But moreover, language *is* but one among many social behaviors, and the
meanings of words and sentences *are* determined by the world-view of the
speaker's group, since they're the ones from whom the speaker learned her
language.

This can be supported with examples; I'll use a close-to-home one. As a
grader, I've recently been spending a lot of time trying to puzzle through
the poor writing of UT undergrads. In some cases, I find it necessary to
note on their papers the actual meaning of sentences which are grammatical
but misleading. The meaning intended by the student is often apparent, but
the sentence has a meaning distinct from the one the student intented. The
meaning, then, is not determined by the intentions of the student, but by
the conventions of our common language. Likewise, a child cannot make a
knight's move in chess the way he likes (magically pushing across rows of
opposition to win the game), but only in the way that the rules of chess
allow him to move the knight.

This is the reason that I can't say, "Dinner is almost ready" and mean
"Poughkeepsie was once the capital of New York," however much I might want
to.

Of course, this does not mean that the *thoughts* which one expresses in
language are socially determined, or that the *truth* of one's utterances
are socially determined (unless the utterance has as its subject matter
something social). But language itself certainly is but one among many forms
of socially determined behavior.

So Roger's account of postmodernism not only includes a wide variety of
non-postmodernists, it also makes postmodernism true.

Bryan



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To: TOC Cyberseminar <cybersem@objectivistcenter.org>

Sent: Tuesday, September 21, 1999 12:51 PM

Subject: Cyberseminar: Defining Post-modernism

[From: William Dale ]

Hello, everyone!

Here's my attempt to differentiate the cultural movement of
Post-Modernism from other movements such as Objectivism by using three of
the epistemological standards David suggested of UNIT, CONTRAST OBJECTS,
and CCD. I follow this analysis by offering a definition of
post-modernism based on those standards.

UNIT: I agree with Bryan that PM is essentially a cultural movement
rather than a philosophical movement. It's defenders are concerned with
changing the culture more than on philosophical theses per se. As
Stephen Hicks pointed out in his talks on PM two summers ago, PM are
defenders of a political position first, and concerned with philosophical
ideas only as a means to the defense of their politics.

The units of post-modernism are the group of cultural opponents of
modernism and/or modernity. According to my philosophical encyclopedia
[Urmson and Ree (eds.) The Concise Encyclopedia or Western Philosophy and
Philosophers], PM's oppose 1) the belief in the advancement of society
through scientific advancement and epistemological enlightenment (i.e.
modernity) and 2) traditional standards in art and language (i.e.
modernism). They replace these with Post-Modernity, a "carefree
skepticism about any attempt to make sense of history," and
Post-Modernism, in which "language [is] treated as an object in its own
right, rather than a stand-in for an ulterior reality." These theses may
explain the advancement of PM through Literature and Sociology
departments, rather than the philosophy departments where the Modernist
analytic philosophy is predominant.

The units of the concept would therefore be the adherents of a cultural
movement who reject the idea of historical scientific progress,
philosophical enlightenment, metaphysical realism, and standards of
artistic achievement.

CONTRAST OBJECTS: Identifying the contrast objects is straightforward
give the self-descriptive nature of the term in question, i.e. defenders
of modernism and modernity (Modernists) of various kinds, including, I
think, Objectivism. Modernists would include any cultural movements
whose adherents accept the possibility of scientific advancement,
philosophical enlightenment, and identifiable standards for aesthetics.

CCD: Post-modernism advances several theses in the major philosophical
branches. David noted that there are often multiple CCD's for complex
concepts, and that seems to be the case for a highly abstract concept
like PM. I think the dimensions of interest come out along the usual
philosophic categories with which we're all familiar. Here are what I
take to be the primary "measurements" for PM along the relevant
dimension:

Aesthetics: rejection of all usual standards

Politics: collectivism (e.g.: environmentalism, group rights, interest
group politics, socialism)

Ethics: egalitarianism and relativism (e.g. cultural relativism, animal
rights)

Epistemology: subjectivism (e.g. textual interpretation/deconstruction)
Metaphysics: media of expression (e.g. texts)

I list these in the above order purposely. I believe there is an
underlying hierarchical organization to the above dimensions for
defenders of post-modernism, and it is an organization that inverts the
usual Objectivist one rising from metaphysics through politics and
aesthetics. PM's are primarily defenders of aesthetic anarchy (e.g.
deconstruction of texts, performance art) and collectivism (e.g. group
rights, egalitarianism) with other philosophical these such as
epistemological subjectivity and ethical relativism as intellectual
defenses to be used as necessary, but dropped if failing to defend the
politics/aesthetics (if I've understood Stephen Hick's thesis about this
correctly).

In conclusion, I offer the following definition of PM:

A cultural movement which rejects the possibility of cultural advancement
through scientific progress and principled aesthetics based on
epistemological objectivity, and which instead defends political
collectivism and standardless aesthetics based on epistemological
relativism and ethical egalitarianism.

William

To: TOC Cyberseminar <cybersem@objectivistcenter.org>

Sent: Tuesday, September 21, 1999 5:19 PM

Subject: Cyberseminar: Why Define 'Post-modernism'

[From: Will Wilkinson]

In these "what is the essence of x" discussions, I often feel somewhat the
obstructionist. I was disgruntled at this summer's advanced seminar by all
the putative definitions of analytic philosophy. Each would exclude paradigmatic
"analytic" philosophers. Likewise, I worry that our discussion of
postmodernism will be equally unsatisfying, and for similar reasons. The
main reason is that there is no monolithic school of thought each of whose
members share a common unifying characterstic. What there is is a cluster of
overlapping themes, not all logically related to the others.

So, if we give an account of postmodernism that captures some of these
themes, we will be missing other themes just as important within
"postmodernist" discussions. If one proposed an account that captured all
the relevant themes, one would have a hodge podge that serves no real cognitive
purpose. The problem is that we have a word, 'postmodernism', that gets
attached to all sorts of things for often bad reasons. And so it is a
quixotic pursuit to try to puzzle out the principle by which this word got applied to
all it got applied to, because there is no principle.

I favor a rather more piecemeal approach to understanding ideas. If what
bothers us about some postmodernists is their denial of the existence of an
independent, objective world, then try to understand why they deny it. If we
are bothered by their theses about the indeterminacy of meaning, then let us
see why they hold them. In the process we'll find that postmodernists are
not too different from analytic philosophers in some of these things, and we can
generalize explanations across schools of thought. I think it would be much
more profitable to try to grasp and criticize doctrines of semantic
indeterminacy in Derrida & Quine together than to try (and surely fail) to
find the ephemeral essence of contingently constituted "schools" unified in
fact by little more than a mood and a literary style.

So here is my challenge to the project of defining postmodernism. Why
think that there is a hard logical core to the whole variegated
cultural/intellectual phenomenon? And if there isn't one, what is the point
of trying to find it. Wouldn't we be better off attacking each of the
bothersome themes of postmodernism separately? Because our recent emphasis on method
stresses getting clear on our intellectual purposes, I think it is necessary
to see if we really have a purpose worth pursuing.

Satan's Little Helper,

-- Will Wilkinson

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Fall 1999 Cyberseminar in Objectivist Studies

All Cyberseminar posts are working papers with copyright
reserved to the author. They may not be published or adapted
without permission, but may be circulated for purposes of
scholarly discussion.

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Sent: Tuesday, October 05, 1999 3:42 PM

Subject: Cyberseminar: Defining Postmodernism
[From Stephen Hicks]

Defining Postmodernism

--------
Abstract

(1) I propose that a definition of a comprehensive philosophy should be
four-dimensional: It should identify the philosophy's metaphysics,
epistemology, view of human nature, and its core value theses. (2) I argue
that there is a comprehensive philosophy characterized by metaphysical
antirealism, epistemological collective subjectivism, social constructionism
in human nature, and value collectivism. (3) I argue that "postmodernism"
is an appropriate label for that philosophy, given the opposition of that
philosophy's theses to modernist philosophy's theses. And (4) I argue that
the views of several major contemporary thinkers (Foucault, Derrida,
Lyotard, Rorty) are similar enough to warrant categorizing them as the
"postmodernist" school.
---------

Defining Postmodernism
Stephen Hicks


Is there a set of ideas that may fruitfully be called "postmodern"?

A comprehensive philosophy answers four questions: What's real?, Who/what
am I?, What's good?, and How do I know? That is, a philosophy is a set of
views on metaphysics, human nature, values, and epistemology.

A philosopher who has developed views has a comprehensive philosophy. To
the extent that different philosophers agree in their views in those areas, they
can be grouped into schools.

So then the questions are whether the thinkers we are considering as
pomo-candidates have developed views in all those areas, and whether their
views are similar enough to warrant categorizing them as members of the same
school.

At this point, Satan Jr. (a.k.a. Will W.) raises two pitfalls to avoid:

1. Defining postmodernism as a school and contrasting it with analytic
philosophy may lead us to miss the fact that analytic and continental
philosophers sometimes agree, e.g., Quine and Derrida on indeterminacy in
language. In other words, a definition may be too narrow and lead us away
from grouping together thinkers who should be so grouped.

2. Defining postmodernism may, if there is no common core, lead us to
characterize it so vaguely that we miss significant debates within the
so-called pomo community. In other words, a definition may be too broad and
lead us to lump together thinkers who should be separated.

We should avoid these two vices, and when appropriate we should follow
Will's advice and attack particular pomo and/or analytic theses themselves. If,
however, there are sets of philosophical theses that are regularly packaged
together and thinkers who organize themselves in schools around those
packages, we should take cognizance of that too.

To start with some leading pomo-candidates and their core views: Foucault
and Derrida both speak of "truth" and "knowledge" as meaningless concepts,
of humans as socially constructed, of far left values, and of deconstruction.
Lyotard rejects metanarratives (i.e., the idea that there is a true account
that can be given of anything), for [a vision composed] of humans as
contingent and socially constructed, far left values, and hermeneutics.
Rorty advocates antirealism, speaks of humanity as contingent and as needing
to evolve in solidarity, speaks of moderately far left values, and
speaks of traditional reason being dead and of irony as its replacement.

So we have a number of individuals who argue the same broad themes:
metaphysical antirealism, reason as an epistemological dead end and various
subjectivist alternatives, human nature as contingent and socially
constructed, and left wing values.

Additionally, each of these thinkers sees this package of views as
internally linked -- in contrast to many analytic thinkers, who will
either not have views in all branches of philosophy or, if they do, see
no essential connections among them (e.g., Quine).

Now for the appropriate label for this set of beliefs. The label
"postmodern" situates this set of beliefs historically and contrasts it with
"modernism." All of the above thinkers take modernism to be metaphysical
naturalism, human nature as universal, rational, and autonomous, values as
individualistic, and reason as the primary epistemological mandate. They
see that modern philosophy as a coherent set of beliefs and as having
reached a dead end. So they accept Lyotard's characterization of our situation as
being a "postmodern" one (The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge.
U. of Minnesota, 1984). Or they see the task, as Rorty states it, as trying to
figure out what to do next "now that both the Age of Faith and the
Enlightenment seem beyond recovery" (Consequences of Pragmatism, p. 175).
The Enlightenment, as Rorty and the others see it, was the modernist
project.

So I propose to define postmodernism as a philosophy that advocates
metaphysical antirealism, epistemological collective subjectivism, value
collectivism and leftism, and social constructionism in human nature.

It's true that many subsidiary issues factor in each broad philosophical
dimension. Each of those subsidiary issues needs to be addressed, and in
doing so it may be useful to note that on a particular subsidiary issue a
postmodern thinker is arguing the same point that an analytic thinker is.
There is a value sometimes to focusing on the trees, or to adopt military
language, in engaging tactically.

It's also true that to the extent a thinker is consistent his views in one
part of philosophy will lead to his adopting views on related issues. And
like-minded thinkers tend to organize themselves into social movements and
alliances that agree on broad principles while disagreeing over details.
Understanding those organizations helps one learn the issues involved, the
state of the debate, and how to navigate the intellectual and social
terrain. So there's also value sometimes to focusing on the forest,
or in engaging strategically.

This broad philosophical characterization of postmodernism I think helps put
in context the many dimensions of postmodern thinking and culture that Will
Thomas, Bryan Register, and Roger Donway identify in their posts on defining
postmodernism.

Will T. identifies four features for our attention: (1) eclecticism, (2)
denial of objectivity, (3) various left positions such as group rights,
ethical relativism, environmentalism, and anti-capitalism, and (4) reaction
against modernism. All of these elements are parts of the pomo package. (1)
Eclecticism is a consequence of the metaphysical anti-realism: if there is
no reality out there, there is no identity, so there are no necessary
connections among things; so anything can go with anything, and in
postmodernist art one finds deliberate disintegrations and deliberate
juxtapositions of parts that cannot be integrated. (2) Denial of objectivity
is the fundamental part of the postmodern anti-reason epistemological
package. (3) The various left positions are parts of the value collectivism.
(4) "Reaction against modernism" is a summary and a negative historical
situating of all of these views. The only thing missing from this list is
an account of human nature.

Similarly, Bryan R. identifies three modernist items and contrasts
postmodernism to them. Modernism's features are (1) Objectivity, (2) Belief
in Progress, and (3) Dualisms. Postmodernism is then a rejection of
objectivity, the belief in progress, and of all dualisms. Again, all of
these are parts of the postmodernist package: the denial of objectivity is
part of the epistemology, the denial of progress is a consequence of both
epistemological relativism and the left-egalitarianism in values, and the
rejection of all dualisms is a part of the postmodern metaphysics or
anti-metaphysics. On one level the postmodernist rejection of all dualisms
is a straightforward consequence of the antirealism: if it's not meaningful
to speak of the way reality is, then any proposed real distinction can be
deconstructed.

(On another level the pomo blanket rejection of dualisms is tricky because
one pomo strategy is to argue by package-deals. For most postmodernists
there are no significant differences between, e.g., Plato and Aristotle, and
so the choice is between postmodernism and the Plato/Aristotle approach.
Similarly, conservatives sometimes characterize the debate as being between
a Platonic/religious philosophy and a nihilistic postmodern one; for those
conservatives there is no significant difference between the naturalistic
Aristotle and the Sophists/postmodernists.)

Finally, Roger D. suggests that antirealism is the fundamental defining
trait of postmodernism. Roger points out that a major modern debate was that
between the realists and the idealists. The realists accepted the Primacy
of Existence and so consequently accepted objectivity and universalism, while
the idealists accepted the Primacy of Consciousness while trying to maintain
objectivity and universalism. However, as the P of C forces gradually won
out, the objectivity and universalism were abandoned and we were left with
postmodern P of C, subjectivity, and relativism. That characterization of
the evolution of the debate I think is correct, and I think it accounts for
the pomos' views in metaphysics and epistemology. I don't think it accounts
for the postmodernist views in human nature, ethics, and politics, though.
>From P of C, subjectivity, and relativism, no particular views about human
nature, ethics and politics follow, so I think we need to look elsewhere for
the sources of those parts of the pomo package. And since specific views on
human nature, ethics, and politics are integral parts of the pomo package,
any definition needs to include them.

In summary: (1) I have proposed that a definition of a comprehensive
philosophy should be four-dimensional: It should identify the philosophy's
metaphysics, epistemology, view of human nature, and its core value theses.
(2) I have argued that there is a comprehensive philosophy characterized by
metaphysical antirealism, epistemological collective subjectivism, social
constructionism in human nature, and value collectivism. (3) I have argued
that "postmodernism" is an appropriate label for that philosophy, given the
opposition of that philosophy's theses to modernist philosophy. And (4) I
have suggested that the views of several major contemporary thinkers
(Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard, Rorty) are similar enough to warrant including
them in the "postmodernist" school.

[Stephen Hicks]


*************************************************
Fall 1999 Cyberseminar in Objectivist Studies

All Cyberseminar posts are working papers with copyright
reserved to the author. They may not be published or adapted
without permission, but may be circulated for purposes of
scholarly discussion.

*************************************************