Spring 2000 Cyberseminar in Objectivist Studies
Nietzsche and Objectivism

Unit Four: April 17 - May 14

William Thomas' Comment
on Eyal Mozes' Review Essay
on the Relationship Between the Philosophies
of Friedrich Nietzsche and Ayn Rand

To: TOC Cyberseminar <cybersem@objectivistcenter.org>

Sent: Sunday, April 30, 2000 12:25 PM

Subject: Cyberseminar: WT Comment on E Mozes Pt. 4 Review Essay

Comment on E. Mozes Part 4 Review Essay
By William Thomas

I was glad to see Eyal Mozes' essay because it puts a challenge to the idea
that Rand was in some sense a Nietzschean early in her development. Eyal
steadfastly refuses to speculate, and articulates a demand for those who
claim a Nietzschean phase to provide incontrovertible proof.

However, I think that in assessing the evidence he has cast his net too
narrowly. Here is his essential point on the evidence:

<Quote from E. Mozes>

As far as I could find, the only defense of the claim that Rand has had a
"Nietzschean phase", with any attempt at presenting evidence for it, has
been by Ron Merrill, in "The Ideas of Ayn Rand", ch. 3... What evidence,
then, does Merrill present for his claim? Merrill's entire evidence - and
the only evidence I have ever seen presented for the claim of a "Nietzschean
phase" - consists of two paragraphs, from a conversation between Kira and
Andrei, in the first edition of We The Living..."

<End quote from E. Mozes>

There is another important place where the claim of a Nietzschean phase is
made, and where evidence is provided for it:

In "Journals of Ayn Rand," pp. 20-21 contain an extended editorial comment
on Rand's 1928 notes for a projected novel: "The Little Street." The
editor, David Harriman, notes the following divergences from Rand's later
views: a) evil as metaphysically efficacious; b) exclusive focus on "whether
a man is motivated to act for himself or not," regardless of his premises or
form of action; c) admiration of "the strong individual who wants to
'command' rather an 'obey;'" d) stating that attitudes or character traits
are innate, which "contradict[s] her advocacy of free will." Harriman's
comments do not amount to an extended case for a Nietzschean phase. Rather,
Harriman assumes (and I think rightly) that such a phase is evident in the
papers he presents.

It is true, as Eyal argues, that Rand in her youth never subscribed fully to
Nietzsche's system of philosophy. I doubt we will ever know even how much of
Nietzsche she read. However, her lack of total commitment to Nietzsche's
philosophy was not due to any commitment to a developed system of her own.
In her early years, Rand was not a philosopher and did not think of herself
as a philosopher. Her papers from the 1920s focus on the creation and
analysis of literature and film. She had a passion for ideas, and her hatred
of collectivism, love of individualism, and admiration for American
capitalism are plain to see. But like any writer, she appears to have seen
these ideas not as topics to be plumbed, but as a creed to express. In any
case, it is plain from the papers collected in "Journals of Ayn Rand" that
before writing "We the Living," Rand was not engaged in the systematic
exploration of philosophic issues.

It was only in the 1930s that Rand began to think of herself as a serious
original thinker on philosophic topics. Thus around 1934 she noted on the
of her "first philosophic journal" the following general comment:

"These are the vague beginnings of an amateur philosopher. To be checked
with what I learn when I master philosophy -then see how much it has already
been said, and whether I have anything new to say, or anything old to say
better than it has already been said." ("Journals of Ayn Rand," 66)

From this comment of Rand's we know that the papers of hers that survive do
not misrepresent her thought by placing no formal philosophy early than
1934. Rand herself thought of her previous notes on ideas as not even
"amateur."

When we look at the early Rand for signs of influence from Nietzsche and
from Nietzscheanism generally, we have to recognize that whatever Rand's
outlook was, it did not at that time consist in a set of well-developed
reflections on philosophic topics. As Eyal notes, in that "first
philosophic journal," we see Rand starting to work through questions that
will lead to her break explicitly with Nietzsche's views on social ethics
and the role of reason in human life. But before the time of those notes, we
have every reason to think Rand was in some significant ways influenced by
Nietzsche. If this shows up most clearly in her depiction of the ideal man
(i.e. Danny Renahan of "The Little Street"), this is perfectly natural: it
is in the creation of such character that the young Rand would have been
focused on implicitly philosophical questions.

I also think Eyal misreads the place in Rand's development where her "first
philosophic journal" falls. Eyal argues that because these papers are dated
to 1934, they show the development in Rand's thought while she was writing
"We the Living." However, "We the Living" appears to have been finished by
this time. In her biography, Barbara Branden states that "Toward the end of
1933, Ayn completed 'We the Living.'" ("The Passion of Ayn Rand," p. 112)
Although the novel was not published until 1936, it was already circulating
among publishers by 1934.

What does this mean? Well, here I have to speculate a little. But I must
remark that if we ban all speculation, then we will lack for even hypotheses
for further investigation. I think it most plausible to see Rand as turning
to deeper philosophic issues as she becomes conscious of the uniqueness of
her views, and as she prepares to write "The Fountainhead." The epigram
from Nietzsche at the start of those notes is unlikely to be accidental:
rather Rand appears to be confronting key premises of the Nietzschean view
in the notes that follow (and drawing strength from Nietzsche as a father of
a modern egoism).

In any case, those are merely probabilities. But what is well established
in the papers Rand left is that her ethical views in the late 1920s are best
described as passionate but relatively unsophisticated Nietzscheanism. But
it is a novelist's Nietzscheanism: contempt for the masses, the extolling of
the superior individual as against the herd, and the occasional use of
indicative terms such as "supermen," ("Journals of Ayn Rand" p. 48) and an
admiration for the initiation of force by the noble against the ignoble
(see the notes in "Journals" pp. 46-47). And, as late as 1935 Rand thought
Nietzsche to be emblematic of her moral orientation.

--Will Thomas

======================================
William Thomas
Manager of Research & Training,
The Objectivist Center
TOC on the Web: www.objectivistcenter.org
My email: wthomas@objectivistcenter.org
=======================================


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Spring 2000 Cyberseminar in Objectivist Studies

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