Fall 1999 Cyberseminar in Objectivist Studies:
"The Continental Origins of Postmodernism"

Week 10: November 15-21 and Week 11: November 22-28

Bryan Register's Comment on Michal Fram-Cohen's Review
of Jacques Derrida's
"Structure, Sign and Discourse in the Human Sciences"
with follow-up

To: TOC Cyberseminar <cybersem@objectivistcenter.org>

Sent: Sunday, November 21, 1999 9:11 PM

Subject: Cyberseminar: BR comment on MFC on Derrida's Argument 1

[From: Bryan Register ]
Derrida's Argument 1


The Notions of Structure and Center

For Derrida, structuralism is not a 20th century phenomenon but is rather
only one instantiation of the history of western metaphysics. At every point
in this metaphysics, it has been claimed that the world has a certain
structure, and that there is something holding that structure together; an
organizing principle of some kind. For instance, Plato held that the Form of
the Good is what rendered the universe harmonious; Kant argued for time as
the basic organizing feature which makes it so that the world is governed by
causal laws. Rand has her 'existence exists'.

This structuring principle, whatever it may be, also cuts off the free play
of ideas about the world. Insofar as a piece of the structure is determined
in its nature by the structuring principle, we cannot think of that piece of
the structure as being different.

Consider how this plays out in primacy of consciousness metaphysics; I'll
take Berkeley's as an example. For Berkeley, there is an ordering scheme to
the universe and that ordering scheme is God. The world has the structure it
has because God so ordains. Moreover, the world is radically dependent on
God as is a property to its substratum. God could alter the structure of the
universe, but is himself unalterable; and thinking that God does not exist
is not a kind of discourse which is possible (the free play of *this* idea
is cut off).

These structuring principles are the 'centers' of their various metaphysical
doctrines. Everything hangs on them, as it were, as a circle is defined by
equidistance of all of its points from the midpoint.

However, Derrida wants to cast some doubt on this notion. Here is his
argument:

As center, it is the point at which the substitution of contents, elements,
or terms is no longer possible. At the center, the permutation or the
transformation of elements... is forbidden. At least this permutation has
always been *interdicted*.... Thus it has always been thought that the
center, which is by definition unique, constituted that very thing within a
structure which while governing the structure, escapes structurality. This
is why classical thought concerning structure could say that the center is,
paradoxically, *within* the structure and *outside it*. The center is at the
center of the totality, and yet, since the center does not belong to the
totality (is not part of the totality), the totality *has its center
elsewhere*. The center is not the center.

So here is the idea. A structured whole is always grounded on some central
premise, tenet, theoretical entity, method, or whatever. But that central
something is never itself structured (but rather very simple). It never
obeys the ordering it imposes on the structure it makes possible; if it had
to obey the ordering, it would not have the independence necessary for a
central foundation.

Now, Michel Fram-Cohen reads this as a denial of non-contradiction and says:

>Nevertheless, he continues to write
>about the center, confident that it can exist and function while not being
>itself. So much for Aristotle in Derrida's esteem.

I don't think this is correct. Notice who it is that Derrida says first
noticed all of this: it's *classical thought* (e.g., Aristotle) which
noticed that the center was not within the structure. Consider as a paradigm
the Platonic Forms, which structure the universe from without the structure;
or even Aristotle's essences, which are not apprehensible by sense and yet
determine the world. Indeed, Derrida takes the tradition to task for this
incoherence:

The concept of centered structure - although it represents coherence itself,
the condition of the episteme as philosophy or science - is contradictorily
coherent. And as always, coherence in contradiction expresses the force of a
desire.

Here, Derrida is alluding to Freudian theory. If in a dream I kill my
father, the fact that I dreamed this means that I want to do it. But the
fact that I *dreamed* it, rather than thinking about it consciously, means
that I want not to do it. Likewise, the notion of the centered structure
restricts the free play of ideas, just as it *is* the free play of ideas.
The notion of a centered structure rejects play just as it makes possible
play of a new kind.

For instance, Descartes made the human subject the center of the structure
of the universe. This made possible all the delirious amusements of early
modern philosophy, until his center evaporated into sense-data under Humean
criticisms. So Kant created the new center, time as something imposed on the
world from without. Note that the imposer of structure on the phenomena is
not among the phenomena, and could not be (just as Descartes's ego was not
within the objective world it made possible). This then made possible German
idealism and metaphysics as it had been known in Continental philosophy up
to, say, Sartre.

So it seems to me that Derrida does not regard himself as doing away with
logic. He is noticing that logic was done away with at the moment of its
creation. Logic is supposed to be the center of the structure of proofs, but
is not itself proved. Logic was yet another means of subjecting play to
restrictions and by so doing creating the possibility of a new kind of play;
a play within the rules of logic (proof theory, the development of symbolic
logic, etc). So logic is intrinsically illogical; contrary to its own
demands, it's not subject to proof, and yet it makes proof possible. Logic
is centered on logical laws which are without logic.

Now, Derrida seems to regard himself as at a different point in history from
someone like Hume. Hume directs lethal criticism at the fashionable center
of the contemporary structure, the human subject. And he does not replace it
with any alternative centering principle. Derrida is different in that he is
not criticizing any single centering principle, but rather the very notion
of a centering principle as such. *All* centers fall outside the structure
they make possible; *all* centers are fictitious impositions on the
imagination.

To: TOC Cyberseminar <cybersem@objectivistcenter.org>

Sent: Sunday, November 21, 1999 9:13 PM

Subject: Cyberseminar: BR Comment on MFC on Derrida's Argument 2

[From: Bryan Register ]
Derrida's Argument 2


Play and the End of Metaphysics

So, once we have realized that whatever center someone might propose is
fictitious - nothing is holding the universe together - what shall we do?
Not have structures? We can't think without structures. Remember, just as
centers restrict thought, they make possible new kinds of thoughts.

Derrida says:

This field (language) is in effect that of *play*, that is to say, a field
of infinite substitutions only because it is finite, that is to say, because
instead of being an inexhaustible field, as in the classical hypothesis,
instead of being too large, there is something missing from it: a center
which arrests and grounds the play of substitutions.

Two points emerge from this passage. The first is the embeddedness of the
very idea of 'center' in all Western (and probably *all*) language. Our
language is just sitting there begging for someone to read some metaphysics
straight out of it. Consider, for instances, Plato's movement from the
universality of reference to the reference to universals, or Kant's
deduction of the structure of the universe from the structure of logic, or
crude substance theorists' inference of the existence of substances from the
existence of subject places in sentences.

The second point has to do with the play of substitutions. I think that this
is where deconstruction comes in - I'm reaching a little here. After the
fact, we can realize that the center of e.g. the early modern philosophical
structure was missing. Once we realize the absence of the human subject from
the world, we can in our discourse realize the absence of the human subject
from the early modern philosophers' writings. We can reinterpret them as we
like, because the center which restricted their play is not there to
restrict ours. Thus, post-deconstruction of early modern philosophy, we can
playfully reinterpret the early moderns however we like; assimilating their
writings and theories to other writings and theories in an amusing,
dilletante-ish way, perhaps incorporating parody and pastiche into
imaginative works of philosophy.

But, Derrida notes, some people don't much like this idea. Consider:

Turned toward the lost or imperceptible presence of the absent origin
[center], this structuralist theme of broken immediacy is therefore the
saddened, *negative*, nostalgic, giulty, Rousseauistic side of the thinking
of play whose other side would be the Nietzschean *affirmation*, that is the
joyous affirmation of the play of the world and of the innocence of
becoming, the affirmation of a world of signs without fault, without truth,
and without origin which is offered to an active interpretation. *This
affirmation then determines the noncenter otherwise than as loss of the
center*. And it plays without security.

Being affirming in this way makes it so that realizing that there is no
center is not merely the realization that there is no center. Rather, this
realization frees us for discourse which is unchained to any arbitrary
metaphysics. We wil move beyond 'man', in the sense that 'man' is just he
who seeks a center.

The divide, for Derrida, is between those honest enough to admit that
metaphysics is gobbledy-gook and to conduct discourse anyway, and those
hypocritical, nervous puritans who need some centering principle to make
them feel alright about performing discourse. (Imagine here people that are
uptight about sex and who want to pray for divine sanction on their wedding
night.) Everyone wants to play, some people just think that they need some
principle not just to make play possible but also to make it acceptable.
Derrida (seems to) agree(s) that a center is needed to make play possible -
there is no thought as we know thought without a structure - but our
engagement with centering principles must be more complicated than mere
acceptance. We must be daring enough *both* to accept some centering
principle(s) as that which makes possible our discourse, and to reject just
that (those) principle(s) as imaginative fictions.

[Bryan Register]


*************************************************
Fall 1999 Cyberseminar in Objectivist Studies

All Cyberseminar posts are working papers with copyright
reserved to the author. They may not be published or adapted
without permission, but may be circulated for purposes of
scholarly discussion.

*************************************************

To: TOC Cyberseminar <cybersem@objectivistcenter.org>

Sent: Monday, November 22, 1999 11:18 PM

Subject: Cyberseminar: Re: Bryan Register's Comment on Derrida

[From: Michal Fram Cohen ]

I would like to commend Bryan Register on clarifying Derrida's
arguments. Nevertheless, I stand by my evaluation of Derrida.

Derrida has a problem with the fact that the center of a structure is
irreducible. He has a problem with axioms as such, e.g. "existence
exists," because they are not controlled by another "higher" axiom. He
also has a problem with the structure of religion because "God" is not
subject to the rules it enforces on the world he created. The notion of
"play" means that the structure can somehow survive without a center.
Can religion survive without the concept of "God"? Can a secular
rational philosophy survive without any axioms?

Most people do not have a coherent, absolute structure of ideas. They
have a package-deal of some religious ideas, some rational ideas and
some personal intuition. Obviously, there is some play going on in such
a package deal, against several competing centers. However, even Derrida
conceded that it was impossible to conceive of a structure without a
center.

The question of the location of the center, whether it is inside or
outside the center, does not mean that "the center is not the center."
For religious people, God is both inside and outside the world he
created, but it does not mean that God is not God. As for Objectivism,
the axiom "existence exists" is certainly inside the structure of the
philosophy, but it also controls the structure.

Michal Fram-Cohen


*************************************************
Fall 1999 Cyberseminar in Objectivist Studies

All Cyberseminar posts are working papers with copyright
reserved to the author. They may not be published or adapted
without permission, but may be circulated for purposes of
scholarly discussion.

*************************************************

To: TOC Cyberseminar <cybersem@objectivistcenter.org>

Sent: Friday, December 03, 1999 8:43 AM

Subject: Cyberseminar: Re: BR Comment on MFC on Derrida's Argument 2

[From: Michal Fram Cohen ]

I have some more thoughts on Bryan's comments on Derrida.

Historically, Derrida is correct that Western philosophy lost the
absolute notion of the center with the collapse of religion. It was
indeed Nietzsche who said that "God is dead." There were, however,
attempts to construct a new secular center - attempts which Derrida
ignores or dismisses as arbitrary. Such attempts range from Kant's
"categorical imperatives" to Hegel's "dialectic law" to Marx's "society"
to Freud's "Id" to the Objectivist axioms. Derrida's assumption that any
metaphysics is arbitrary is *arbitrary*. To my knowledge, he has not
explained why any of the above attempts was arbitrary. His claim in
chapter 10 of "Language and Difference," that the centers of all
philosophies along history were illusionary because philosophy rests on
mythology, which itself has no center, is hardly an explanation.

Ironically, even Derrida cannot free man for a discourse without center.
He admits that when the connection between words and referents is lost,
words cannot last very long. He admits that there is nothing to study
beyond philosophy. His discourse is *arbitrarily* tied to semantics and
concepts as his own version of metaphysics. There is no reason to
consider his metaphysics as less arbitrary than Hegel's or Marx's.

Michal Fram-Cohen


*************************************************
Fall 1999 Cyberseminar in Objectivist Studies

All Cyberseminar posts are working papers with copyright
reserved to the author. They may not be published or adapted
without permission, but may be circulated for purposes of
scholarly discussion.

*************************************************

To: TOC Cyberseminar <cybersem@objectivistcenter.org>

Sent: Sunday, December 05, 1999 10:01 AM

Subject: Fw: Cyberseminar: Re: BR Comment on MFC on Derrida's Argument 2

[Moderator's note: Chris Sciabarra has been following the cyberseminar
recently as a "lurking faculty" member.]

[From: Chris Matthew Sciabarra ]

> There is no reason to
>consider his metaphysics as less arbitrary than Hegel's or Marx's.
>Michal Fram-Cohen

Hello to my fellow cyberseminar participants; Will Thomas recently added me
to the list for the seminar, and though I've been very busy, I've been
reading the posts on Derrida and such with much interest. I'm sorry I've
not been involved from the beginning, but I do appreciate the exchanges.

On one very small point, above, I just wanted to make a few observations,
given my long-time study of both Hegel and Marx. While both of these
thinkers ultimately undermine genuinely dialectical method, in my view, I do
think that there is much scholarly disagreement -- with good reason -- as to
the metaphysical and epistemological foundations in Hegel and Marx.

For example, while Hegel is usually considered a metaphysical idealist, some
critics view him as a thoroughgoing realist. Kenneth Westphal in his study,
HEGEL'S EPISTEMOLOGICAL REALISM: A STUDY OF THE AIM AND METHOD OF HEGEL'S
<<PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT >>, argues that Hegel was a realist antagonist of
skepticism, dogmatism, and Kantian subjectivism. He views Hegel as
fundamentally in revolt against Kant's "subjectifying Copernican revolution
in epistemology," since "in being conscious of the world we are inherently
cognitively related to the world." For Westphal, this position stands as an
"objectifying counter-revolution" against Kant.

So too, with Marx, while much has been made of his materialist
foundations -- and these are certainly present in his writings -- not enough
attention has been paid to his realist foundations in Aristotelian
metaphysics. Scott Meikle addresses this in his superb study, ESSENTIALISM
IN THE THOUGHT OF KARL MARX. I give some attention to the Marxian
metaphysic in my own book, MARX, HAYEK, AND UTOPIA -- and to both Hegel and
Marx in my forthcoming TOTAL FREEDOM: TOWARD A DIALECTICAL LIBERTARIANISM.
In short, Marx rejects the "vulgar" idealists and the "vulgar" materialists,
and begins with the primacy of existence -- arguing that existence exists,
that there is nothing prior to, nor posterior to existence, and that any
belief in first cause is illegitimate. True, he views consciousness as
something situated in a definite historical and social condition -- it is
not an abstraction, but something specific that exists in an objective
context.

Moreover, he projects the possibilities for transformation through human
agency. Indeed, "free, conscious activity," declares Marx, is the human
"species-character," and labor, as such, is a creative activity "affirmed in
the objective world."

My point here is not to trumpet Hegel and Marx -- but to argue simply that
there are a lot of subtleties in their writings which, on second and third
glance, make it much more difficult to easily pigeon-hole them into one or
another specific metaphysical category.

I realize this is tangential to the discussion on Derrida -- but I did wish
to respond to the suggestion.

Cheers,
Chris
=====================================
Chris Matthew Sciabarra, Visiting Scholar
NYU Department of Politics
715 Broadway
New York, New York 10003-6806
=====================================


*************************************************
Fall 1999 Cyberseminar in Objectivist Studies

All Cyberseminar posts are working papers with copyright
reserved to the author. They may not be published or adapted
without permission, but may be circulated for purposes of
scholarly discussion.

*************************************************

To: TOC Cyberseminar <cybersem@objectivistcenter.org>

Sent: Sunday, December 05, 1999 3:26 PM

Subject: Cyberseminar: Re: BR Comment on MFC on Derrida's Argument 2

[From: Michal Fram Cohen ]

I thank Chris Sciabarra for his comment on Marx and Hegel.
I certainly agree that they, as well as Kant, cannot be dismissed off
hand without some study. The first part of my post criticized Derrida
for not referring to them in his survey of the history of Modern
Philosophy. Derrida refers only to Heidegger, Nietzsche and Freud, who
attempted to do away with the notion of a "center" in Modern Philosophy.

He does not bother to even mention the attempts by Kant, Hegel and Marx to
construct a new secular center for Modern Philosophy once the religious
center had collapsed.

Michal Fram-Cohen


*************************************************
Fall 1999 Cyberseminar in Objectivist Studies

All Cyberseminar posts are working papers with copyright
reserved to the author. They may not be published or adapted
without permission, but may be circulated for purposes of
scholarly discussion.

*************************************************

To: TOC Cyberseminar <cybersem@objectivistcenter.org>

Sent: Monday, December 06, 1999 9:11 PM

Subject: Cyberseminar: Re: BR Comment on MFC on Derrida's Argument 2

[From: Chris Matthew Sciabarra ]

[Michal Fram-Cohen] wrote:
>I thank Chris Sciabarra for his comment on Marx and Hegel.
>I certainly agree that they, as well as Kant, cannot be dismissed off
>hand without some study. The first part of my post criticized Derrida
>for not referring to them in his survey of the history of Modern
>Philosophy. Derrida refers only to Heidegger, Nietzsche and Freud, who
>attempted to do away with the notion of a "center" in Modern Philosophy.

Just wanted to say that I surely didn't assume dismissal of Marx and Hegel
in Michal's post; but for me as someone who has spent almost 20 years
studying Marx especially, the point was worth noting.

>He does not bother to even mention the attempts by Kant, Hegel and Marx to
>construct a new secular center for Modern Philosophy once the religious
>center had collapsed.
>Michal Fram-Cohen

Actually, Michal brings up a very important point; some writers, like Murray
Rothbard, have focused lots of attention on Hegel and Marx in particular
(see his History of Economic Thought) for their eschatological roots, and
how they very much take up the whole imagery of apocalyptic religious
writing in their theories of history, creating, in essence, a new kind of
religious ideology, albeit one with a secular center, as Michal suggests.

Cheers,
Chris
=============================================
Chris Matthew Sciabarra, Visiting Scholar
NYU Department of Politics
=============================================


*************************************************
Fall 1999 Cyberseminar in Objectivist Studies

All Cyberseminar posts are working papers with copyright
reserved to the author. They may not be published or adapted
without permission, but may be circulated for purposes of
scholarly discussion.

*************************************************