Fall 1999 Cyberseminar in Objectivist Studies: "The Continental Origins of Postmodernism"

Week 3: September 27 - October 3

EYAL MOZES ON ROGER DONWAY'S REVIEW OF HEIDEGGER'S "WHAT IS METAPHYSICS?"

Sent: Thursday, September 30, 1999 10:27 AM

Subject: Cyberseminar: EM Comment on RD on Heidegger

[From: Eyal Mozes]

ARE RAND'S AND HEIDEGGER'S "METAPHYSICS" THE SAME CONCEPT?

Roger Donway, like Bryan did earlier, tries to read Heidegger's
argument charitably. Roger sees Heidegger's argument as an attempt to
demonstrate that metaphysics is a legitimate and important field of
knowledge, and finds several implications of the argument which he
believes Objectivists should welcome.

In understanding Heidegger's defense of metaphysics, and whether it has
any value from an Objectivist perspective, a crucial question is: is
Heidegger's concept of "metaphysics" the same concept that Objectivists
designate by that word? If not, is there at least significant overlap
in the meaning of the two concepts? Roger does not address this
question directly, but his entire discussion assumes an
affirmative answer. I would argue, on the contrary, that the answer is
no; there is no significant overlap at all between Heidegger's and
Rand's concepts of metaphysics; Rand and Heidegger completely differ,
not only in the content of their metaphysics, but in their conceptions
of the subject matter of metaphysics, and of its function as an area of
knowledge.

For Rand, metaphysics studies those principles that are true for all
existents. Metaphysics' function is to provide the pre-conditions of
knowledge; the framework that must be established - at least implicitly
- to make any knowledge of specific entities possible.

The Objectivist concept of metaphysics thus designates a crucially
important, but very delimited, area of knowledge. It consists of the
axioms; the principle of the primacy of existence; some basic ideas
about the nature of time and space; and that's about it. Metaphysics
can't provide any profound or interesting knowledge; it can only
explicitly identify what is so trite and obvious that every person, if
he has gained enough knowledge to survive in the world at all, must
already understand at least implicitly. Roger correctly notes (B.3.)
that metaphysics is a field that Objectivists haven't written much
about; but I don't agree that metaphysics deserves to be mapped out
better; Objectivists haven't written much about it simply because there
is very little to say about it.

Heidegger's metaphysics, in contrast, consists of superior knowledge,
knowledge that goes beyond knowledge of any specific existents. The
value of metaphysics is not in providing any sort of pre-conditions for
specific knowledge; it provides us with "experience of the truth of
Being", "enquiry over and above what-is", without which "there is no
self-hood and no freedom"; "no scientific discipline can hope to equal
the seriousness of metaphysics". While Heidegger's descriptions of
metaphysics and its value have no clear meaning, the one thing that is
clear about it is the implication that metaphysical knowledge is very
profound, hard to attain, and gives our life and our thinking some
superior state which can't be attained by mere knowledge about specific
existents. It is hard for me to think of any characterization of a
field of knowledge that can be further away from metaphysics as
understood by Objectivism.

(On a historical note, I believe the Objectivist concept of metaphysics
is closer to the traditional concept. I believe the term "metaphysics"
originated in the middle ages, because when a copy of Aristotle's
previously-lost writings had been discovered, the casket containing the
book on metaphysics happened to be located after - "meta" - the casket
containing the book on physics; the word was not intended to imply that
metaphysical knowledge is in some way superior to or "goes beyond"
knowledge of physics. There are people in this CyberSeminar who know
much more about history of philosophy than I do, so someone please
correct me if I'm wrong on this.)

So, given how totally different Heidegger's concept of metaphysics is
from the Objectivist concept, the next question is: does Heidegger's
concept of metaphysics designate a valid area of knowledge, which is of
some value? I think the answer is clearly no. William, in his
commentary on Bryan's essay, already noted that Heidegger blatantly
commits the fallacy identified by Rand as reification of the zero. If
we remove the parts of Heidegger's metaphysics that depend on this
fallacy, is there any of it left? As far as I can see, no.

EMOTIONS AS SUPERIOR TOOLS OF COGNITION

In Rand's discussion of the reification of the zero, she gives the
following quote from Heidegger as identifying the motive behind the
fallacy: "Genuine utterances about the nothing must always remain
unusual. It cannot be made common. It dissolves when it is placed in
the cheap acid of mere logical acumen." I assume this quote is from
another piece by Heidegger, since I did not find it in "What is
metaphysics"; but it's easy to find quotes in "What is Metaphysics"
that express the same motive. "If this breaks the sovereignty of reason
in the field of enquiry into Nothing and Being, then the fate of the
rule of 'logic' in philosophy is also decided. The very idea of 'logic'
disintegrates in the vortex of a more original questioning." (para.
64). Heidegger uses his concept of metaphysics to dismiss logic,
asserting a superior, profound, hard-to-attain mode of knowledge
accessible only through emotion.

Roger attempts to read Heidegger's view of the role of emotion
charitably, suggesting that maybe in Heidegger's view "emotions-such as
boredom and dread-are not cognitive but paths to cognition", similarly
to the Objectivist view of the role of emotions as signals of
automatized identifications and evaluations, pointing us to facts that
we may have overlooked and need to attend to (B.1.). Roger's attempt at
charity, however, just doesn't work.

The possibility of using emotions to guide one's thinking, depends on
the fact that the emotion's object can be understood logically;
further, that the emotion is itself the result of logical thinking
previously performed and automatized. That is precisely what Heidegger
denies; Heidegger regards the emotions of boredom and dread as putting
us in touch with *what cannot be understood logically*. The value
Objectivists recognize for emotions in guiding one's thinking - by
logically examining the identifications and evaluations that led to the
emotion, and deciding whether they were valid - is thus precisely what
Heidegger's view *cannot* allow.

"NIHILATION" AND "THE ENTERPRENEURIAL APPROACH TO LIFE"

Does Heidegger's metaphysics have any implications that can provide a
positive influence in guiding people in their life? Roger believes that
it does, and makes a connection to Kelley's view of the entrepreneurial
approach to life (B.5.). On this point, I frankly think Roger's efforts
at charity have led him to a fanciful reading, with no
connection at all to Heidegger's actual words. This is an example of
Roger's earlier point (A.7.), that Heidegger's writing is so obscure
that "we get as many valid readings of Heidegger as there are
intelligent readers". Still, there are certain limits to what can be
made semi-plausibly consistent with Heidegger's statements, and I
believe Roger has gone beyond that limit.

Heidegger's notion of "nihilation" - "total relegation to the vanishing
what-is-in-totality" - is, like all his notions, difficult to
understand or to make sense of. But if there is one thing that is clear
about it, it is that it involves detachment from any specific
existents; it is not consistent with attending in one's thinking to the
identity of any specific entities, actions or relationships. So when
Roger tells the story of a married man foreseeing his future marriage
to another woman (Roger's point 26), and remarks that "That is
nihilation in spades", his remark makes no sense at all. Assuming that
the man and woman in this story acted with some rationality, and
didn't just divorce their current spouses and got married on a whim;
then for the man to realize the future possibility of their marriage,
he had to realize the unhappy state of his own current marriage; attend
to the attraction he was feeling towards the woman he just met;
consider his requirements in his romantic life; in sum, he had to think
very carefully and pay close attention to many specific entities and
relationships in his life. What can possibly be further away from
"total relegation to the vanishing what-is-in-totality"?

More generally, the entrepreneurial life, as Kelley describes it, is a
life of very careful attention and effort to observe all the specific
events and relationships that affect one's life; rigorous logical
thinking to determine one's hierarchy of values, not allowing any
values to be accepted passively from authority or by social osmosis;
and consideration of all the events and relationships one observes to
determine their potential effect on one's future and their relation to
one's values. Heidegger's "nihilation" is as inconsistent with such
thinking as one can get.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we should be careful not to let a writer's use of some
words we like (such as "metaphysics", or "freedom") make us assume that
he must be saying something interesting. When interpreting a writer
like Heidegger, it is most important, when he uses a word like
"metaphysics", to carefully consider whether what he means by such a
word has anything in common with what we would mean by it. In
Heidegger's case, the answer is that there is nothing in common; and
consequently, there is no basis for finding any positive value in
Heidegger's lecture, or any implications that Objectivists have reason
to like.

Eyal Mozes

*************************************************
Fall 1999 Cyberseminar in Objectivist Studies

All Cyberseminar posts are working papers with copyright
reserved to the author. They may not be published or adapted
without permission, but may be circulated for purposes of
scholarly discussion.

*************************************************

Subject: Cyberseminar: Metaphysics: RD responding to Eyal

[From: Roger Donway]

My thanks to Eyal Mozes for raising a question concerning the meaning of
metaphysics that I had not considered.

First, however, I want to take up a preliminary question. If I read
Heidegger too charitably, or appeared even to read him sympathetically, part
of the reason may be that I had to spend so much time immersing myself in
his thought just to understand him, and then had to spend so much more time
elaborating on his thought just to expound it. Under such circumstances,
there will always be a danger of clientele-ism. I know from experience that
it is extremely common affliction in the field of foreign policy. No doubt,
it is equally common in philosophy. And I may have succumbed to it.

Now to metaphysics. As Eyal observes, the etymology of the word tells us
nothing about its subject matter. ta meta ta physika simply means "the
(works) that come after the Physics." As Sir David Ross puts it: the name
"meant merely the treatises which were placed after the physical works in
Andronicus' edition." Heidegger undoubtedly knew that. But he delighted in
using pseudo-etymologies in explaining his meaning, and this is surely what
he is doing both at the beginning of his essay and in §§71-72.

What, then, does he mean by calling metaphysics "an enquiry over and above
what-is (§72)"? Eyal writes: "Heidegger's metaphysics . . . consists of
superior knowledge, knowledge that goes beyond knowledge of any specific
existents." I would say: In a sense, yes; in a sense, no. As I said in my
point 5, I see him as assuming that "Metaphysics inquires into the nature of
beings just in so far as they are beings." And I read Heidegger in this way
principally because it seems to fit with the polemical nature of his
lecture. For the positivists, physics treats entities just in so far as they
are composed of matter and energy. Chemistry treats entities just in so far
as they are composed of atoms. Biology treats entities just in so far as
they are alive. Psychology treats entities just in so far as they are
conscious. And so on. In Heidegger's terms, these sciences examine the
"what-is," the "this-such." But there is no field of "positive" knowledge
that treats entities just in so far as they are entities. That is what I
thought Heidegeger was getting at by trying to redeem metaphysics, and that
is why he calls it "an enquiry over and above what-is." Is this "superior
knowledge, knowledge that goes beyond knowledge of any specific existents?"
One could say that, on my interpretation, without committing Heidegger to
mysticism.

Does this differ from the Objectivist concept of metaphysics? For
Objectivism, Eyal says, "metaphysics studies those principles that are true
of all existents." To me that comes fairly close to the Heideggerean
conception.

[Roger Donway]


*************************************************
Fall 1999 Cyberseminar in Objectivist Studies

All Cyberseminar posts are working papers with copyright
reserved to the author. They may not be published or adapted
without permission, but may be circulated for purposes of
scholarly discussion.

*************************************************

Sent: Sunday, October 10, 1999 12:55 PM

Subject: Cyberseminar: Metaphysics: Comment on Roger Donway's Response to Eyal

[From: Michal Fram Cohen ]

First, I would like to officially greet all the Cyberseminar
participants and thank William Thomas for letting me join the seminar at
this point. I am in awe of the intellectual and civil level of the
posts I have read.

************************************************************************

Since the scheduled time for discussing "What is Metaphysics" is ending
tomorrow and the Summary by Stephen Hicks has already been posted, I
would like to comment very briefly on Roger Donway's response to Eyal.
I am confining my comment to Heidegger's discussion of metaphysics in
the essay "What is Metaphysic," while I am aware that Roger Donway was
drawing on other writings by Heidegger as well in his review essay.

My first point is that Heidegger is not concerned with the historical
facts of the etymology of the term "metaphysics." Roger writes that
Heidegger knew the source of the term (i.e. "the volume coming after
Physics") but "delighted in using pseudo-etymologies." This playful
attitude, however, does not fit in a serious academic treatise. If
Heidegger wanted to provide a new definition for metaphysics, which
would mean "a discipline that studies what is above the realm of
physics" he should have found another term, rather than invent an
etymological meaning. Rand was in a similar situation when she wanted to
use the term "Rationalism" for her new philosophy, but realized that it
had already been used by the Rationalists with the wrong rationalistic
meaning. Consequently, she used the term "Objectivism" instead.

My second point is that, the way I read Heidegger in "What is
Metaphysics," he did not intend his metaphysics to have any connection
to the physical world. Roger quotes Heidegger as saying that his
metaphysics "inquires into the nature of beings just in so far as they
are beings," which Roger reads as the abstraction of entities in the
physical world. I could not find where Heidegger was relating "beings"
to actual entities. Instead, he was calling upon man to disconnect
himself from the realm of actual entities (the world of "what is") in
order to be able to conceive of the realm of "beings." I read "beings
just in so far as they are beings" to mean: beings unto themselves, as
an end in itself. Heidegger stresses in "What is Metaphysics" that
metaphysics is concerned with "what is 'other' than what-is." Meaning:
"beings" are whatever is other than entities, not abstraction of
entities. For this reason, I do not think that Heidegger's metaphysics
bears a similarity to the Objectivist metaphysics. His is the
metaphysics of another dimension, to be characterized as 'other than'
the physical world, and roaming with "beings."

Michal Fram-Cohen


*************************************************
Fall 1999 Cyberseminar in Objectivist Studies

All Cyberseminar posts are working papers with copyright
reserved to the author. They may not be published or adapted
without permission, but may be circulated for purposes of
scholarly discussion.

*************************************************