Spring 2000 Cyberseminar in Objectivist Studies
Nietzsche and Objectivism

Unit One: January 31 - February 20

Discussion of Stephen Hicks' Introductory Essay
on Human Nature and Values in Friedrich Nietzsche's
Geneology of Morals and Beyond Good and Evil

Sent: Thursday, February 10, 2000 8:19 PM

Subject: Cyberseminar: Slaves & Masters in Hicks' Part One Introductory Essay

[From: Thomas Gramstad]

I thought I'd toss in a few comments and suggested answers to the
questions posted by Stephen Hicks:

> Nietzsche's main theses are that:
...

> 3. Slave morality praises weakness, passivity, dependence,
> humility, and related traits.

I think there exist also more "aggressive" types of slave
morality. For example the kind of vindictive revengefulness which
eats up a person until s/he is virtually defined by it. This can
lead to action and purposefulness, but it is still slave morality,
because this person is defined by a primary evil that s/he is
vengeful against, and any goodness or virtues are secondary to
this perceived great evil that s/he is plotting and fighting
against -- and if s/he succeeds in vanquishing this enemy, is left
empty and without a purpose.

> Questions for discussion:
>
> On point 1:
>
> a) Are the two types either/or or more-or-less
> characterizations? I.e., for Nietzsche, is everyone deep-down
> either a slave or a master, or are we all mixes and degrees of
> the two sets of traits?

This raises an issue of the purpose of one's reading, e.g.,
is the goal to:

(1) Find out what Nietzsche, the historical person, believed --
contradictions, warts and all;
(2) Find out what positions his system of thought, his premises,
logically entail (may at times conflict with (1));
(3) To wash the gold out of the dirt, i.e., to seek and identify
what is of value in Nietzsche's thought and integrate this
with Objectivism or "The Truth"

I think we should probably be doing all three, and be as clear as
possible at all times about when we are doing what.

I'd say that his system of thought implies a more-or-less view,
that we are all mixes and degrees of the two sets of traits; that
the goal is not to be "pure" one or the other, but to discover and
grow those traits that make us vital and healthy (which are
usually and mostly master traits).

> On points 2 and 3:
>
> b) Nietzsche never praises the masters for their intelligence or
> deep thinking. Instead he assigns to the slaves the virtue of
> intelligence. He regularly describes the slaves' leaders as
> cunning, as having devised long-term strategies, as having
> interesting depths of mind, and so on. Why is intelligence on
> the side of the slaves?

I don't think it's that "intelligence is on the side of the
slaves"; it's one particular form of calculating slyness which he
sees as a developed compensation for direct strength and courage
in those who lack the latter. Intelligence is a much wider
concept than calculating slyness, so it doesn't follow that
Nietzsche holds that masters are unintelligent.

> d) By emphasizing weakness and passivity, how can the slave
> morality possibly be a life- and power-enhancing strategy?

Four words: Sanction of the victim.
If the strong and independent can be made to feel guilty and
shameful, to accept collectivist altruist doctrines, then they
can be exploited.

Also, a herd of angry, spiteful ants can conquer and eat a snake.

More to come later...
- Thomas
Thomas Gramstad
"Our society won't be truly free until "None of the Above" is
always an option." -- Eric S. Raymond


*****************************************************
Spring 2000 Cyberseminar in Objectivist Studies
cybersem@objectivistcenter.org

All Cyberseminar posts are working papers with copyright
reserved to the author. They may not be published or adapted
without permission, but may be circulated for purposes of
scholarly discussion.

*****************************************************

 

To: TOC Cyberseminar <cybersem@objectivistcenter.org>

Sent: Thursday, February 10, 2000 8:21 PM

Subject: Cyberseminar: Genealogy of Morals in Hicks' Part One Introductory Essay

[From: Thomas Gramstad ]

[More] ...comments and suggested answers to the
questions posted by Stephen Hicks:


> On points 6 and 7:
>
> e) Why do a genealogy of morals? Why not say instead: Here are
> the opposed values and virtues of the master and slave
> moralities, and here is why the slave morality is false and the
> master morality true? Why should their origins be anything more
> than of historical interest?

Because, for Nietzsche, the processes and the stages they pass
through are the fundamental thing, constitute the fundamental
answers, and therefore is the source of power and control. To
say, "here are the opposed values and virtues of the master and
slave moralities, and here is why the slave morality is false..."
etc., would only give an instant image of a particular moment in
time, while the important thing is the pattern, the direction of
changes over time.

> g) There is a traditional Athens-versus-Jerusalem opposition in
> cultural history. What is the significance of Nietzsche's
> choosing Rome instead of Athens to oppose to Jerusalem?

Athens was an aristocratic republic; Rome was (mostly) an
aristocratic dictatorship or oligarchy. By choosing Rome,
Nietzsche gave himself, unfortunately, more leeway for the
"Will to Power" idea.

> On point 8:
>
> h) How, given the characteristics of masters and slaves, could
> the slave morality possibly have won? If everything the slaves
> stand for is psychologically and constitutionally alien to the
> masters, how could the masters have given up or bought into the
> slave morality? Nietzsche said the slaves' weapon was their
> moral code, but how could it have been effective?

Isn't the answer to that provided in Galt's Speech? :-)

The two moralities aren't entirely alien to each other, since they
are both human. This issue underscores the more-or-less answer a
couple of questions above. The altruist moral code is efficient
for ruling as per Rand's description; in addition Nietzsche also
describes historical processes whereby a master morality could
decay into a slave morality, such as the example from the syllabus
where he described an aristocrat master morality turning into a
religious or priestly master morality and from there into a slave
morality.

> On point 12:
>
> m) Nietzsche doesn't tell us what form a new or rejuvenated
> master morality will take. Is it in any way predictable, or do
> we just have to wait for the Zarathustras to emerge and see what
> they generate?

Based on what I wrote in my commentary on Jason's review, I think
that the Objectivist ethics is it. Possibly the renewed Epicurianism is a
candidate as well.

> Please feel free to pick and choose among these questions to
> address, and to add others.

More to come later...
- Thomas
Thomas Gramstad
"Our society won't be truly free until "None of the Above" is
always an option." -- Eric S. Raymond



*****************************************************
Spring 2000 Cyberseminar in Objectivist Studies
cybersem@objectivistcenter.org

All Cyberseminar posts are working papers with copyright
reserved to the author. They may not be published or adapted
without permission, but may be circulated for purposes of
scholarly discussion.

*****************************************************
 

To: TOC Cyberseminar <cybersem@objectivistcenter.org>

Sent: Monday, February 14, 2000 10:46 PM

Subject: Cyberseminar: The Role of Intelligence

[From: David L. Potts ]

Thomas Gramstad writes, answering Stephen Hicks:

> > b) Nietzsche never praises the masters for their intelligence or
> > deep thinking. Instead he assigns to the slaves the virtue of
> > intelligence.
>
> I don't think it's that "intelligence is on the side of the
> slaves"; it's one particular form of calculating slyness which he
> sees as a developed compensation for direct strength and courage
> in those who lack the latter. Intelligence is a much wider
> concept than calculating slyness, so it doesn't follow that
> Nietzsche holds that masters are unintelligent.

But this won't do for an answer, because the text - at least the _Genealogy
of Morals_ - says quite otherwise. Intelligence is indeed a sort of
compensation for weakness. It is acquired as a result of error and failure,
most particularly punishment at the hands of the stronger (i.10, ii.3,15).
It is interesting and significant that Nietzsche ascribes the development of
memory and reason not to man's experience with nature generally but
specifically to violence at the hands of other, more powerful men. This is
the chief burden of ii.1-15. Hence "this really dismal thing called
reflection" (ii.3) is not a native instinct; the faculty of thinking is
"that most impoverished and error-prone organ!" (ii.16). And, contrary to
what you say, there seems to be no other, alternative form of intelligence
possessed by the masters. Rather, "cunning," calculation, "in a certain
sense _constitutes_ thought" (ii.8, emphasis original).

Small wonder, then, that the blond beasts are never described as being very
bright. Rather, lists of their attributes - "the active, the strong, the
spontaneous and the aggressive" (ii.11) is typical - always emphasize the
unconscious and the instinctual. Indeed, people getting smarter is a sign of
social decay (i.12)! Finally, Nietzsche says point blank that the men of
_ressentiment_ are smarter than the masters (i.7,10).

The relative cleverness of the slaves and guilelessness of the masters
provides a ready explanation for how the masters could have been hoodwinked
by the slaves. But I don't think it is the _necessary_ explanation. Rather,
Nietzsche simply did not associate "dismal reflection" with vitality. He
agreed with the Hamlet that "the native hue of resolution is sicklied o'er
with the pale cast of thought." The texts quoted imply that he regarded
thought as a paltry thing compared with instinct. Instinct is the source of
dynamic, spontaneous action; instinct feels _free_. Thought is labored and
constraining, a recourse to which no one would turn whose muscles and
instincts were sufficient.

This point is of the greatest divergence from Rand, who regarded the mind as
efficacious and "instincts" as largely an excuse for not thinking; who
regarded "the strong" to _be_ strong precisely in virtue of their reasoning
minds; who held that all virtue is essentially intellectual; who regarded
intellect as our primary means of survival, not a fall back position. In
evaluating the two thinkers, this is a contrast we must keep firmly before
us.

-David Potts


*****************************************************
Spring 2000 Cyberseminar in Objectivist Studies
cybersem@objectivistcenter.org

All Cyberseminar posts are working papers with copyright
reserved to the author. They may not be published or adapted
without permission, but may be circulated for purposes of
scholarly discussion.

*****************************************************